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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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A Way Forward: Policy Reforms<br />

At present, security reforms are floundering for lack <strong>of</strong> meaningful action. No matter how<br />

the new constitution interprets democracy or <strong>Tunisia</strong>n identity, there will still be major<br />

hurdles to overcome in pursuit <strong>of</strong> a stable and accountable security force. Presented here<br />

are just a few policy recommendations that would help achieve that end.<br />

• Competitive retraining. Reforming police behavior is paramount to the<br />

restoration <strong>of</strong> domestic security in <strong>Tunisia</strong> and thus to the well-being <strong>of</strong> the<br />

country as a whole. Simply removing all those <strong>of</strong>ficers who served under the Ben Ali<br />

regime would not solve the problem, not only because it would mean the creation <strong>of</strong> a<br />

large group <strong>of</strong> disaffected and unemployed citizens, many <strong>of</strong> which would likely have<br />

made honest public servants, but also because <strong>of</strong> the logistical difficulty <strong>of</strong> replacing<br />

them all at once. Several countries, including Canada, Italy, and Finland, have <strong>of</strong>fered<br />

assistance in retraining, but the problem remains <strong>of</strong> how to implement training on<br />

such a large scale, for tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers. That touches on the corollary<br />

problem <strong>of</strong> the inflated size <strong>of</strong> the police force.<br />

• Both problems could be partially solved through the implementation <strong>of</strong> a<br />

competitive retraining program, one in which <strong>of</strong>ficers are eligible for retraining<br />

in cohorts based inversely on seniority, allowing those with longer service history<br />

more time to adjust to the new pr<strong>of</strong>essional environment before competing for<br />

retraining. The Interior Ministry, in coordination with elected <strong>of</strong>ficials, would<br />

determine an ideal police force size, from which a passing rate for the retraining<br />

would be derived, thus succeeding in both retraining <strong>of</strong>ficers, retaining those who are<br />

best suited to the job, and reducing the size <strong>of</strong> the force to a more manageable<br />

number. Ideally, pr<strong>of</strong>essional development programs would help those who did<br />

not pass to transition to alternate employment.<br />

• Wage increases. The long-term gains from pay increases to low- and mid-level<br />

police <strong>of</strong>ficers should make the policy cost-neutral or even positive, even though it<br />

may appear more expensive in the short run. Substantial savings should have accrued<br />

from the dissolution <strong>of</strong> the political police, and the gradual reduction in the size <strong>of</strong> the<br />

administrative police outlined above should also cut program costs, even after<br />

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