Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
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A Way Forward: Policy Reforms<br />
At present, security reforms are floundering for lack <strong>of</strong> meaningful action. No matter how<br />
the new constitution interprets democracy or <strong>Tunisia</strong>n identity, there will still be major<br />
hurdles to overcome in pursuit <strong>of</strong> a stable and accountable security force. Presented here<br />
are just a few policy recommendations that would help achieve that end.<br />
• Competitive retraining. Reforming police behavior is paramount to the<br />
restoration <strong>of</strong> domestic security in <strong>Tunisia</strong> and thus to the well-being <strong>of</strong> the<br />
country as a whole. Simply removing all those <strong>of</strong>ficers who served under the Ben Ali<br />
regime would not solve the problem, not only because it would mean the creation <strong>of</strong> a<br />
large group <strong>of</strong> disaffected and unemployed citizens, many <strong>of</strong> which would likely have<br />
made honest public servants, but also because <strong>of</strong> the logistical difficulty <strong>of</strong> replacing<br />
them all at once. Several countries, including Canada, Italy, and Finland, have <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
assistance in retraining, but the problem remains <strong>of</strong> how to implement training on<br />
such a large scale, for tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers. That touches on the corollary<br />
problem <strong>of</strong> the inflated size <strong>of</strong> the police force.<br />
• Both problems could be partially solved through the implementation <strong>of</strong> a<br />
competitive retraining program, one in which <strong>of</strong>ficers are eligible for retraining<br />
in cohorts based inversely on seniority, allowing those with longer service history<br />
more time to adjust to the new pr<strong>of</strong>essional environment before competing for<br />
retraining. The Interior Ministry, in coordination with elected <strong>of</strong>ficials, would<br />
determine an ideal police force size, from which a passing rate for the retraining<br />
would be derived, thus succeeding in both retraining <strong>of</strong>ficers, retaining those who are<br />
best suited to the job, and reducing the size <strong>of</strong> the force to a more manageable<br />
number. Ideally, pr<strong>of</strong>essional development programs would help those who did<br />
not pass to transition to alternate employment.<br />
• Wage increases. The long-term gains from pay increases to low- and mid-level<br />
police <strong>of</strong>ficers should make the policy cost-neutral or even positive, even though it<br />
may appear more expensive in the short run. Substantial savings should have accrued<br />
from the dissolution <strong>of</strong> the political police, and the gradual reduction in the size <strong>of</strong> the<br />
administrative police outlined above should also cut program costs, even after<br />
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