Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
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Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation<br />
Anna Wilson<br />
Defining the Enemy<br />
What is perhaps most remarkable about <strong>Tunisia</strong>’s revolution is the way in which the guilt<br />
has been focused down onto so few individuals: both the guilt for the suffering <strong>of</strong> the<br />
population under the former regime, and the blame for the current social and economic<br />
situation—in essence onto the person <strong>of</strong> the former President himself, Zine El Abidine<br />
Ben Ali, his wife and her extended family. This is remarkable in that, while <strong>Tunisia</strong>’s<br />
post-decolonialization history is one dominated openly by only two men, and a single<br />
(albeit renamed) party that funneled money and power in the country very tightly into the<br />
hands <strong>of</strong> very few, five decades <strong>of</strong> single-party rule has meant that it is difficult to see the<br />
limits <strong>of</strong> individuals’ interactions with the regime.<br />
Moreover, while there have been many expulsions from public <strong>of</strong>fice, particularly<br />
in the Ministry <strong>of</strong> the Interior, there could have been many more. Instead, <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns<br />
seemed content to wait patiently through a period <strong>of</strong> technocratic rule—essentially that <strong>of</strong><br />
the same bureaucrats who had been running the country under the old regime—provided<br />
the clear term limits were adhered to and the President himself bowed to demands that he<br />
“dégage” (French for “clear out”). The question now, however, over a year after the<br />
revolution and with <strong>Tunisia</strong> governed for the first time by electoral will, is where the<br />
population and the political elites will draw the line between who should be punished and<br />
who was just doing their job, how to find the line for the bare minimum demanded for a<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> justice having been served.<br />
There are a number <strong>of</strong> areas where these questions raise pressure points on<br />
<strong>Tunisia</strong>’s post-revolutionary society. First, the question <strong>of</strong> what to do about the former<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD),<br />
currently an illegal party, but whose members still make up the <strong>of</strong>ficials elected at<br />
municipal levels, since new elections have not yet been held. Second, there is the<br />
concern that members <strong>of</strong> Ennahdha are preoccupied with gaining political revenge for the<br />
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