Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

more broadly, to identify potential lessons to be learned from this case that might apply to
other Arab Spring states in their continuing struggles to establish a new order.
Background
Although wide-spread and broad-based political discussions pertaining to political
institutions and constitutions are a new freedom for the vast majority of the Tunisian
population, they are by no means an anomaly in modern Tunisian history. In fact, this
institutional practice and method of reform can be traced back to 1861, when Muhammad
III as-Sadiq, then Bey of Tunis, drew-up the first constitution in the Arab World. This
was the culmination of a significant struggle between two movements in the Tunisian
elite: the Zeytuna movement of the Zeytuna school, and the Destour (constitution) school.
The enactment of this constitution, and the prominence that this later gave to the Destour
Movement, began a process which continues to inform today’s discussions. The
centrality of the institutional underpinnings of this movement in subsequent movements
in Tunisia gained prominence again when the Destour Movement, established in 1920,
became the focal point of Tunisia’s anti-colonial struggle against the French. Following
Tunisia’s independence in 1956, the leader of the Neo-Destour Party, Habib Bourguiba
became the leader of the new nation. The constitution that he enacted in 1959, and the
Destour ideology, remained in place, first through the Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD),
and later by the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) under Ben Ali,
until the 2011 uprising.
The 1959 constitution was designed to encourage Bourguiba’s modernist vision
for Tunisia and included many progressive elements. Particularly of note was the
inclusion of the Personal Status Code that included constitutional protection for women’s
rights unparalleled in the Arab World and beyond. It should be pointed out that although
Bourguiba’s vision was notably progressive, this is not to suggest that this was in
opposition to ‘non-progressive’ Islamic groups. In fact, it is pertinent to note that the
majority of Tunisia’s population are followers of the Maliki religious school of Sunni
Islam, a school of law that allows considerable scope for the interpretation of religious
texts.
82