Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
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This is in sharp contrast to the military’s vigilant and proactive attempts to ensure that<br />
ongoing, widespread strikes throughout the country do not jeopardize the country’s<br />
economic well-being. The army is very unlikely to ever become a guardian <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong>n<br />
secularism.<br />
Civil-Military Relations after the Revolution<br />
The future role <strong>of</strong> the military in <strong>Tunisia</strong> will be determined in large part by the capacity<br />
<strong>of</strong> the civilian government, and its ability to exercise oversight <strong>of</strong> the army. The exact<br />
working relationship between the current transitional government and the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n<br />
military is opaque, and the military was reluctant to allow any <strong>of</strong>ficers to speak with us<br />
directly. Nonetheless, certain aspects <strong>of</strong> the relationship can be inferred from other<br />
sources. The current <strong>Tunisia</strong>n government is having great difficulty determining how to<br />
deal with its internal security challenges. Efforts to prevent the salafists from threatening<br />
public order have been half-hearted, and the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Interior has operated as though it<br />
is unsure <strong>of</strong> its mandate or policies. The current Interior Minister Ali Larayedh, a senior<br />
figure within Ennahdha, was himself tortured as a political prisoner at the hands <strong>of</strong> Ben<br />
Ali’s Interior Ministry and has appeared reluctant to use force in politically-charged<br />
cases. The transformation <strong>of</strong> the bloated internal security forces constructed during the<br />
Ben Ali regime into a modern, pr<strong>of</strong>essional domestic security force will take time, and<br />
there is little evidence that the process is even yet underway. In addition, Ennahdha<br />
appears to trust the military, and relations between the two appear to be generally warm.<br />
In this situation, there is every reason to believe that the army is largely deciding on its<br />
own when and where to end strikes, pursue militants inside <strong>Tunisia</strong>, and otherwise<br />
enforce domestic stability. As discussed above, this is a politically dangerous situation<br />
for the military, because without clearly established civilian oversight, it may be held<br />
responsible for those unhappy with the decisions it does make, for example, to force<br />
striking workers back to their factories.<br />
That this arrangement has been workable thus far speaks to the pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism<br />
and good judgment <strong>of</strong> the army, but also to the institutional weakness <strong>of</strong> the current<br />
government where military matters are concerned. The current Minister <strong>of</strong> Defense,<br />
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