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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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managing to retain power, is one that the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n population is very conscious <strong>of</strong>. These<br />

political parties have almost universally been extremely unsuccessful. Voting in the<br />

recent elections for the Constituent Assembly has been widely described by<br />

commentators seeking to explain Ennahdha’s victory as an expression <strong>of</strong> identity by the<br />

<strong>Tunisia</strong>n people—an expression that they are Arab Muslims first. However, a case might<br />

also be made that Ennahdha represented as far from the former regime as possible, as<br />

well as being a organization large enough to credibly resist the influence <strong>of</strong> former RCD<br />

members.<br />

Of course, the opposing view might be <strong>of</strong>fered as well—that by some estimated<br />

25% <strong>of</strong> RCD members were Islamists and may well have voted for Ennahdha, while<br />

many others were unwilling to be seen voting for the parties <strong>of</strong> former RCD members in<br />

the recent elections, and therefore stayed home out <strong>of</strong> confusion. This might prove<br />

significant in terms <strong>of</strong> political electioneering for the next general elections to be held in<br />

late <strong>2012</strong>.<br />

Another vital consideration is the effect <strong>of</strong> the top-down political reform approach<br />

that <strong>Tunisia</strong> has chosen. While elections have been held to determine the state level<br />

government, municipal elections are scheduled to be held in April <strong>2012</strong>. The individuals<br />

currently holding those <strong>of</strong>fices, therefore, date to before the revolution, and an<br />

overwhelming majority <strong>of</strong> them either belonged to or were identified with the RCD. For<br />

many people, the corruption <strong>of</strong> the regime was not represented so much in the person <strong>of</strong><br />

the Interior Minister or the President’s extended family, but rather in the quality <strong>of</strong><br />

service they received on a local level—the local RCD party chief in a district represents<br />

the party to them. This has implications in that it implies that a top down purge is also<br />

likely to be unsatisfactory, while at the same time, it is unlikely that many local level<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficials had the influence or power to be involved in the kind <strong>of</strong> serious and large scale<br />

corruption for which legal recourse might be considered.<br />

While the public demand may have been for a complete break with the RCD, it<br />

appears that intellectual opinion inside <strong>Tunisia</strong> is split. There are many who are arguing<br />

that all the skill and experience <strong>of</strong> keeping the state functioning is held within the RCD<br />

and that they form a powerful organized group with great disruptive powers. Rumors are<br />

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