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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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Social Science Forum <strong>2012</strong>) Similar polls were also conducted in April 2011 and August<br />

2011, and views <strong>of</strong> the army have remained relatively consistent over this period. 35 This<br />

faith in the army contrasts sharply with the cautious attitude <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns have developed<br />

towards the security sector in general (31% express confidence, 31% express distrust),<br />

and the current governing coalition in the Constituent Assembly (25% express<br />

confidence, 34% express distrust). The institution <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n military has no peers<br />

in the eyes <strong>of</strong> the population.<br />

However, this confidence in the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n military is based on the perception that<br />

the army has no desire for greater political power, and that it continues to discharge its<br />

duties in as apolitical a fashion as possible. Throughout the numerous interviews<br />

conducted in Tunis at the end <strong>of</strong> January <strong>2012</strong>, no one anywhere on the political spectrum<br />

expressed any interest in seeing the army take a more active role in the administration <strong>of</strong><br />

the country. <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns trust the military far more than the civilian government, but they<br />

much prefer to see the latter institution work through its mistakes without military<br />

guidance.<br />

While this view is to be expected from supporters <strong>of</strong> Ennahdha and other parties<br />

that belong to the current governing coalition, the same view was expressed just as<br />

strongly by politicians and activists that identify with the secular left. Although<br />

<strong>Tunisia</strong>ns <strong>of</strong>ten speak <strong>of</strong> Turkey as a developmental model to follow, there appears to be<br />

no appetite for the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n military to act as a guardian <strong>of</strong> Bourguiba-style secularism,<br />

as the Turkish military has been generally seen as defending the modernizing, secular<br />

legacy <strong>of</strong> Ataturk. Neither is this commitment to civilian control <strong>of</strong> the military purely<br />

abstract. Salafist groups have exploited the security vacuum in <strong>Tunisia</strong> on numerous<br />

occasions to agitate for a fundamentalist vision <strong>of</strong> Islam that is clearly worrying to many<br />

members <strong>of</strong> the secular elite. Nonetheless, all parties appear to recognize that enforcing<br />

the law against the salafists is the proper role <strong>of</strong> the elected government, and no figure we<br />

spoke with felt the army should intervene to crack down on the salafists. The Army, for<br />

its part, appears to have no desire to become involved in such a fraught political dispute.<br />

35 In April 2011, 82% <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns expressed confidence in the army, as did 66% <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns in<br />

August 2011. (Applied Social Science Forum <strong>2012</strong>)<br />

148

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