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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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Some Possible Explanations<br />

The hesitation that Ennahdha has displayed in dealing with the salafis has contributed to<br />

prolonged violence and tensions. This seems in contradiction to Ghannouchi’s recent<br />

declarations and the text he published in January 2007, where he declared that the<br />

“radical groups like the Salafist Jihadists constitute a major obstacle to the<br />

democratisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong>n society, which has never espoused a radical interpretation <strong>of</strong><br />

Islam throughout its history” (Allani 2009, 266).<br />

In order to shed light on what might appear as a contradiction, the reasons several<br />

factors need to take into account.<br />

Firstly, Ennahdha is undergoing a crucial phase in its history. From a movement<br />

banned from politics and constrained to act clandestinely, it has become the main<br />

<strong>Tunisia</strong>n party, representing 40% <strong>of</strong> the electorate. This dramatic change happened in less<br />

than one year. The ideological discourse that Ghannouchi had elaborated in more than 30<br />

years suddenly had to be adapted into a political program in order to propose solutions to<br />

bread-and-butter issues, such as unemployment, economic crisis and violence on the<br />

streets. After the toppling <strong>of</strong> Ben Ali’s regime, Ennahdha saw the chance to have its say<br />

on <strong>Tunisia</strong>n politics and took advantage <strong>of</strong> that. However this choice came at a cost:<br />

Ennahdha had to grapple with the rules <strong>of</strong> the political arena and draft a program that<br />

could be appealing to the largest possible number <strong>of</strong> electors, who, however were ready<br />

to reward the party for its staunch opposition to the ancien regime. This transition marked<br />

the transformation <strong>of</strong> the movement from a marginal actor in <strong>Tunisia</strong>n politics to a mass<br />

party.<br />

In this change, Ennahdha is getting closer to what Otto Kircheimer called a<br />

“catch-all party,” a party that sacrifices its ideological positions in order to maximize its<br />

electoral appeal and mobilizes voters on policy preferences rather than on ideology<br />

(Safran 2009, 543-554). Ghannouchi and other prominent Ennahdha members have<br />

several times declared that the priorities in today’s <strong>Tunisia</strong> are the social and economic<br />

issues, and not the theological questions. This approach to politics has shown how<br />

Ennahdha is drifting toward a model <strong>of</strong> policy-oriented party, rather than an ideologydriven<br />

one, an approach that is more likely to guarantee good performances at the polls.<br />

109

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