Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
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Some Possible Explanations<br />
The hesitation that Ennahdha has displayed in dealing with the salafis has contributed to<br />
prolonged violence and tensions. This seems in contradiction to Ghannouchi’s recent<br />
declarations and the text he published in January 2007, where he declared that the<br />
“radical groups like the Salafist Jihadists constitute a major obstacle to the<br />
democratisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong>n society, which has never espoused a radical interpretation <strong>of</strong><br />
Islam throughout its history” (Allani 2009, 266).<br />
In order to shed light on what might appear as a contradiction, the reasons several<br />
factors need to take into account.<br />
Firstly, Ennahdha is undergoing a crucial phase in its history. From a movement<br />
banned from politics and constrained to act clandestinely, it has become the main<br />
<strong>Tunisia</strong>n party, representing 40% <strong>of</strong> the electorate. This dramatic change happened in less<br />
than one year. The ideological discourse that Ghannouchi had elaborated in more than 30<br />
years suddenly had to be adapted into a political program in order to propose solutions to<br />
bread-and-butter issues, such as unemployment, economic crisis and violence on the<br />
streets. After the toppling <strong>of</strong> Ben Ali’s regime, Ennahdha saw the chance to have its say<br />
on <strong>Tunisia</strong>n politics and took advantage <strong>of</strong> that. However this choice came at a cost:<br />
Ennahdha had to grapple with the rules <strong>of</strong> the political arena and draft a program that<br />
could be appealing to the largest possible number <strong>of</strong> electors, who, however were ready<br />
to reward the party for its staunch opposition to the ancien regime. This transition marked<br />
the transformation <strong>of</strong> the movement from a marginal actor in <strong>Tunisia</strong>n politics to a mass<br />
party.<br />
In this change, Ennahdha is getting closer to what Otto Kircheimer called a<br />
“catch-all party,” a party that sacrifices its ideological positions in order to maximize its<br />
electoral appeal and mobilizes voters on policy preferences rather than on ideology<br />
(Safran 2009, 543-554). Ghannouchi and other prominent Ennahdha members have<br />
several times declared that the priorities in today’s <strong>Tunisia</strong> are the social and economic<br />
issues, and not the theological questions. This approach to politics has shown how<br />
Ennahdha is drifting toward a model <strong>of</strong> policy-oriented party, rather than an ideologydriven<br />
one, an approach that is more likely to guarantee good performances at the polls.<br />
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