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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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as a conduit for citizens’ interests and as a check against government abuse. In<br />

authoritarian regimes, civil society does not properly perform this function. The<br />

authoritarian state co-opts and represses civil society, and the state’s survival usually<br />

depends on keeping civil society weak and disorganized. <strong>Tunisia</strong>, from independence to<br />

the January 2011 revolution, was a classic case <strong>of</strong> a single-party state whose preservation<br />

was dependent on the ability <strong>of</strong> the party to “contain pluralistic competition within its<br />

own rules and organization or [to] skillfully manage the sources <strong>of</strong> pluralism so as to<br />

tame them within the single-party framework” (Zartman 1991, 11). In a healthy<br />

democracy, civil society is a central source <strong>of</strong> such pluralistic competition, but<br />

throughout <strong>Tunisia</strong>’s whole post-independence history, civil society was effectively coopted<br />

by the single-party state.<br />

In <strong>Tunisia</strong>, the country’s two single-party regimes between 1956 and 2011—<br />

Habib Bourguiba’s Neo-Destourian Party and later the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD)<br />

and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD)—<br />

used different tactics to ensure that civil society in <strong>Tunisia</strong> remained fragmented and<br />

impotent, posing no serious opposition to their respective regimes. Bourguiba was a<br />

skilled manipulator, encouraging the development <strong>of</strong> a robust-seeming civil society and<br />

mass political mobilization while playing factions against one another and co-opting<br />

threatening opposition figures with attractive government jobs. Ben Ali was less cunning<br />

and more openly repressive—closely monitoring and tightly controlling all sources <strong>of</strong><br />

opposition while maintaining a thin veneer <strong>of</strong> democratic openness.<br />

The Bourguiba Years<br />

The fact that <strong>Tunisia</strong> does not seem an intuitive choice as an Arab authoritarian state is<br />

largely attributable to Habib Bourguiba’s regime. Bourguiba embarked <strong>Tunisia</strong> on a<br />

national project <strong>of</strong> modernization that was extremely secular and progressive in its<br />

promotion <strong>of</strong> women’s rights, and in many ways associated itself more closely with<br />

France and the tradition <strong>of</strong> French rationalism than with its Arab neighbors. The<br />

nurturing <strong>of</strong> an active, if tightly monitored and controlled, civil society in <strong>Tunisia</strong> was<br />

central to Bourguiba’s project <strong>of</strong> modernizing and civilizing <strong>Tunisia</strong>. “Since the days <strong>of</strong><br />

116

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