Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

degrees. With such a large number of unemployed yet educated youth, having dim prospects for future employment as the global economy was recovering from a massive financial crisis, was a recipe for change. In fact, as the employment situation worsened for these youth it became clear that the social contract in Tunisia was fraying rapidly. The appetite for centralized control of government, indeed dictatorship, waned as the promise of jobs and an egalitarian society diminished. The country of Bourguiba became the country of Ben Ali and this leader had failed to deliver on promises that kept the system intact and the people willing to surrender political freedoms. The implosion of this social contract was spurred on in no small part by the dissatisfaction of these youth who had known no other ruler than Ben Ali but knew that his time needed to be over if they were going to take their future back. Part and parcel of any discussion of unemployment in Tunisia is the issue of poverty. Pervasive in the language of the Tunisians interviewed was the term the “Two Tunisias.” This term is meant to signify the economic and social divide between those in the interior and those on the long coast of this North African nation. Poverty is widespread in the interior of Tunisia, hampered by lack of access to infrastructure and education and the geographic restrictions that often exist with the coastal region of nations built on trade and tourism. One of the main contributors to the revolution, to Bouazizi’s act of rebellion, was the poverty and inequality experienced by many in the interior of Tunisia and the dignity lost as their way of life fell further and further away from being able to provide for self and family. In fact, nine out of every ten jobs created in Tunisia was created on the coast, representing an ever-widening gulf between interior and coast: the revolution began in the interior and spread to the coast. The seeds of revolution in the interior were characterized by the idea that the way of living in many parts of Tunisia had come to resemble not really living at all. Indeed, there were those that thought death was preferable to the pre-revolution situation and when death becomes a viable alternative, the fear of that fate begins to dissolve. This phenomenon was experienced in Tunisia. “Political change comes before social change,” was how Mr. Rachid Ghannouchi characterized the situation and the feeling of the people around the time of the revolution (SAIS Group Meeting, 24 January 2012). It was time to cast off the 10
political system before any of the social and economic changes that needed to take place could occur and a corrupt and violent regime was the target. Corruption and Political Violence It goes without saying that centralized power corrupts, indeed “absolute power corrupts absolutely,” and the Ben Ali regime was no different. Aside from the usual yet pervasive corruption within the government, there was a bigger source of corruption and public discontent than is usually considered standard practice in a dictatorship: the actions of the family of Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Ben Ali and the Trabelsi family. The corruption of Mrs. Ben Ali and her family came to characterize the bankruptcy of the regime and the loss of any and all legitimacy for Ben Ali to continue to reign. In what is widely considered an egalitarian society, the blatant corruption of the first family—including massive accumulation of wealth, business seizures and extortion of the highest order—could not be reconciled with the tough conditions faced by those in the rest of the country. The actions of the Trabelsi family hindered economic growth and job creation in Tunisia and sent a clear message to businesses around the world, “If you are going to invest or do business in Tunisia, our cut comes first.” The aforementioned destructive behavior of the first family, which only accelerated and became more brazen over time, simply could not stand, and again the social contract of Tunisia crumbled further. The image of the Trabelsi’s plundering the businesses of Tunisia and scaring away foreign investment could not be united with the narrative of Bouazizi and his produce cart. This narrative, a man that was driven to self-immolate in the name of dignity, juxtaposed with a regime and family guilty of wanton corruption was unacceptable. In addition to this corruption, there was corruption of a different sort: political violence. This corruption—of the security forces against the people of Tunisia—finds no stronger example than the story of Gafsa in 2008. This city in the interior of Tunisia experienced a major incident in 2008 which saw a brutal police crackdown and fatalities as the people protested the unfair handling they were shown by receiving unfair wages and treatment. Gafsa, known singularly for its phosphate industry, was mentioned several times in Tunis as the “real” genesis of the revolution. It was the brutal police 11
Page 1: Johns Hopkins University School for
Page 7 and 8: Acknowledgements We are most gratef
Page 9 and 10: List of Acronyms AKP Adalet ve Kalk
Page 12 and 13: xii
Page 14 and 15: proposed goal (as in the previous e
Page 16 and 17: democracy is a continual testing pr
Page 19 and 20: What’s in a Revolution? The timin
Page 21: limited to Tunisia, these vivid dep
Page 25: discontent of so many in Tunisia wh
Page 28 and 29: eality,” signified by Tunisian pe
Page 30 and 31: mantra sparked the Kasbah sit-ins r
Page 32 and 33: in early January of 2011, you would
Page 34 and 35: independence from the Ottoman Empir
Page 36 and 37: ack to the 1970s (SAIS Group Meetin
Page 39 and 40: Two Tunisias: How A Revolution Whic
Page 41 and 42: continued to cite statistics claimi
Page 43 and 44: inequality were most severe. Combat
Page 45 and 46: in government could drop precipitou
Page 47: for bold political leadership in Tu
Page 50 and 51: History of Secularism in Tunisia In
Page 52 and 53: 1) Freedom to form and to join orga
Page 54 and 55: Source: Stepan, Alfred C. “Religi
Page 56 and 57: terms of campaigning, the political
Page 58 and 59: that in practice many people who es
Page 60 and 61: Short-term • Secular parties must
Page 63 and 64: Islamism and Laïcité in the Tunis
Page 65 and 66: girl, a high-achieving student at h
Page 67 and 68: laws are either supported directly
Page 69 and 70: and she argues that he, like many s
Page 71 and 72: during exams, preventing other stud
Page 73 and 74:
Constituent Assembly should keep th
Page 75 and 76:
Women’s Rights in Tunisia: A “N
Page 77 and 78:
dismiss the question as a non-issue
Page 79 and 80:
In immediate post-revolutionary Tun
Page 81 and 82:
Others express concern about the va
Page 83 and 84:
something every Tunisian boy does n
Page 85 and 86:
Mr. Ghannouchi is equally surprised
Page 87 and 88:
Mr. Hedri showed concern over the l
Page 89:
has occurred in response to politic
Page 93 and 94:
The Post-Transition Constitutional
Page 95 and 96:
Theoretical Literature While there
Page 97 and 98:
Tunisian Case Following Ben Ali’s
Page 99 and 100:
parties. With the internal arrangem
Page 101 and 102:
issues of unemployment, reduced cor
Page 103 and 104:
Recommendations • NCA and politic
Page 105 and 106:
Political Party Development Amy Ham
Page 107 and 108:
experience and expertise, will be k
Page 109 and 110:
with Laryssa Chomiak, SAIS group me
Page 111 and 112:
epresented a complete departure fro
Page 113 and 114:
To some extent, the focus on the qu
Page 115 and 116:
• Enhance the legitimacy and enfo
Page 117 and 118:
Ennahdha and the Salafis Roberta Lu
Page 119 and 120:
The trial against Nabil Karoui, the
Page 121 and 122:
Some Possible Explanations The hesi
Page 123 and 124:
the salafist movement Al-Salafiya A
Page 125 and 126:
violence, to lay the bases for a ne
Page 127 and 128:
Tunisian Civil Society Before and A
Page 129 and 130:
Bourguiba,” Bellin points out,
Page 131 and 132:
nip in the bud any challenges to pa
Page 133 and 134:
“training-of-trainers” (ToT) ev
Page 135 and 136:
The focus of civil society groups i
Page 137 and 138:
economic development in Tunisia. Th
Page 139 and 140:
The Tunisian Youth Fallout: A Look
Page 141 and 142:
that they found voting to be the mo
Page 143 and 144:
head (Dégage, 2011). It should the
Page 145 and 146:
graduates are unemployed (SAIS Grou
Page 147 and 148:
to participate as a citizen in a de
Page 149 and 150:
are rumored to consist only of 3,00
Page 151 and 152:
Medium-term • At some point, the
Page 153 and 154:
Part III: Security, Justice and Eco
Page 155 and 156:
The Role of the Military in Post-Be
Page 157 and 158:
insufficient to prevent the demonst
Page 159 and 160:
disruptions during voting, the tota
Page 161 and 162:
This is in sharp contrast to the mi
Page 163 and 164:
Recommendations While the military
Page 165 and 166:
Internal Security and Reform in Tun
Page 167 and 168:
The Implements of Repression There
Page 169 and 170:
undesirable organizations, stifle d
Page 171 and 172:
evolution, many police, especially
Page 173 and 174:
A Way Forward: Policy Reforms At pr
Page 175 and 176:
Transitional Justice and National R
Page 177 and 178:
Those released therefore included p
Page 179 and 180:
The current situation in many ways
Page 181 and 182:
circulating that the informal strik
Page 183 and 184:
the commercial interests of the ban
Page 185 and 186:
and clear limits to police behavior
Page 187 and 188:
Addressing Unemployment Rebekah Cha
Page 189 and 190:
The forecasting is based on the ass
Page 191 and 192:
of its revolution. This has had a c
Page 193 and 194:
Boosting the Tourism Sector The tou
Page 195 and 196:
absorb all of the university gradua
Page 197 and 198:
language and technology skills, whi
Page 199 and 200:
Understanding Unemployment in Tunis
Page 201 and 202:
ather than shifts from low to high
Page 203 and 204:
Figure 2: Unemployment by age and e
Page 205 and 206:
the Tunisian economy. Thus, creatin
Page 207 and 208:
• Encourage entrepreneurship: Tra
Page 209 and 210:
U.S. Assistance in Tunisia Cody Die
Page 211 and 212:
cultural differences that may inhib
Page 213 and 214:
the Constitutional Assembly in Tuni
Page 215 and 216:
order to receive these funds over o
Page 217 and 218:
and access to jobs in Libya for Tun
Page 219 and 220:
Conclusion P. Terrence Hopmann The
Page 221 and 222:
the domination of the salafis and o
Page 223 and 224:
well educated, but under or unemplo
Page 225 and 226:
persons, a huge contingent for such
Page 227 and 228:
List of Interviewees Washington DC,
Page 229 and 230:
• Salah Bourjini, former division
Page 231 and 232:
• Ahmed Ibrahim, Secretary of the
Page 233 and 234:
Bibliography Abouzeid, Rania. 21 Ja
Page 235 and 236:
Cook, Steven A. 20 January 2011.
Page 237 and 238:
Le Monde. 25 January 2011. “Tunis
Page 239 and 240:
Silver, Vernon. 12 December 2011.
Page 241:
World Bank. 2004. “Dynamique de L
show all

Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?