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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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have an organizational mechanism with a platform that was well understood by the<br />

people. Furthermore, the splintering <strong>of</strong> the secularists into several factions made it<br />

difficult to discern the ideological differences between them and to secure a significant<br />

amount <strong>of</strong> seats for any one party. The secular parties also did not do a good job <strong>of</strong><br />

campaigning on their own or engaging with <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns, particularly within the interior.<br />

While the election outcome brings into question the popularity <strong>of</strong> secular ideology<br />

in post-revolution <strong>Tunisia</strong>, some <strong>of</strong> the people that we spoke with questioned this<br />

conclusion. Oussama Romdhani, the former Ben Ali Communications Minister,<br />

speculated that a large percentage <strong>of</strong> those who did not vote in the elections, <strong>of</strong> which<br />

there were many, would have voted for the secularists (SAIS Group Meeting, 25 January<br />

<strong>2012</strong>) . This speculation is credible, as the religious parties had a major “get out the vote”<br />

campaign and only garnered 17.7% <strong>of</strong> the vote when considering votes received out <strong>of</strong> all<br />

those eligible to vote including those who did not. Nevertheless, this assertion is largely<br />

speculation and it is very difficult to hypothesize about why people did not vote as well<br />

as whom they would have voted for and why. It does give credibility to the idea that<br />

secularism is more predominant than one might expect based on voter turnout and the<br />

results <strong>of</strong> the elections. Mostly, this makes sense because, while the Ben Ali regime lost<br />

credibility toward its end, this loss was in large part due to corruption. Therefore, some<br />

secular principles must have been nascent within the population for Bourguiba and Ben<br />

Ali to remain in power for so long. Whether or not it started out that way, most likely the<br />

policies and education created by both regimes acted as a form <strong>of</strong> cultural hegemony to<br />

socialize the population to favor a particular form <strong>of</strong> secular ideology. While this will be<br />

explored later in this chapter, it is essential to understand the intricacies <strong>of</strong> politics,<br />

organizational mechanisms, complications in ideology and identity, bias as a result <strong>of</strong> the<br />

previous party, and a lack <strong>of</strong> voting culture to realize why it might appear that secularism<br />

is less popular than one might expect.<br />

Currently, there is a large push among the secular parties to consolidate their<br />

platforms and thereby try to unite and streamline their points <strong>of</strong> view during the next<br />

elections. Furthermore, depending on the capacity <strong>of</strong> the coalition government to resolve<br />

the problems <strong>of</strong> economic reform as well as the lessons learned by the secular parties in<br />

43

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