Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
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circulating that the informal strikes and sit-ins taking place in the south <strong>of</strong> the country are<br />
driven by individuals who failed to win seats in the constitutional assembly elections and<br />
ex-RCD members out for revenge. However, it is also clear that the key figures in the<br />
party departed with the President, leaving a near complete leadership void. The answer<br />
instead, therefore, it might be argued, is to strengthen the other political organizations,<br />
rather than weakening further the RCD per se.<br />
There is also a powerful argument to be made that for national reconciliation to<br />
happen, and for <strong>Tunisia</strong> to move forward in its political development, a cohesive decision<br />
must be taken on the status <strong>of</strong> former RCD members. Certainly the most grievous<br />
<strong>of</strong>fenders <strong>of</strong> the central government (and at local levels, if the evidence exists) must be<br />
tried and punished, but this clearly cannot be done for the whole organization. If the<br />
party itself remains illegal, then it is to be expected that its former members might seek to<br />
replicate it under another (or several other) names. Interestingly, the Ennahdha<br />
leadership has reportedly been seeking dialogue with senior former RCD figures, with<br />
mentions <strong>of</strong> a pr<strong>of</strong>fered amnesty. How this would affect the public perception <strong>of</strong> the<br />
party and justice remains to be seen, especially considering the fact that the newly<br />
liberated media in <strong>Tunisia</strong> has denounced former regime members very harshly, and there<br />
is a huge stigma associated with belonging to the party, with little discernment made<br />
between members.<br />
The Police<br />
“This was not a revolution against Ben Ali. It was a revolution against the police,”<br />
declared the young leader <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong>’s most successful new NGOs dealing with<br />
election monitoring and encouraging youth participation in the political system. And it is<br />
true that it was the continuous pressure <strong>of</strong> a police state, with its petty corruption as much<br />
as its limitations <strong>of</strong> freedoms, that finally exploded into the revolution. Of all the organs<br />
<strong>of</strong> the state, as Colin Machado points out in his chapter, it is the police which were most<br />
associated with Ben Ali and the power <strong>of</strong> the regime, and they who stayed most closely<br />
allied with him during the revolution. The contrast in the attitude <strong>of</strong> the population to the<br />
police and the army, which famously refused to fire on the protestors and eventually<br />
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