Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
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Abdelkrim Zbidi, was a medical doctor before being elevated to his current position<br />
under the previous interim government. That he was asked to stay on following the<br />
elections <strong>of</strong> October 2011 suggests that he has a good working relationship with General<br />
Ammar. However, there is little evidence <strong>of</strong> previous experience with security or<br />
military matters in his background, reinforcing the likelihood that he does not provide a<br />
significant institutional check on the decisions <strong>of</strong> the military.<br />
The leaders <strong>of</strong> Ennahdha, for their part, do seem to be aware <strong>of</strong> the importance <strong>of</strong><br />
ensuring civilian control over the military. In negotiations over the rules that were to<br />
govern the country while a formal constitution is being drafted, Ennahdha initially<br />
proposed that the Prime Minister be placed in charge <strong>of</strong> the armed forces directly. This<br />
would have both placed the military under Ennahdha’s control, and fulfilled its long-term<br />
goal <strong>of</strong> weakening the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the President in favor <strong>of</strong> the Prime Minister. However,<br />
objections from virtually all other political parties forced Ennahdha to agree that the<br />
President would remain the titular commander <strong>of</strong> the armed forces (Ghali 2011). While<br />
neither the current President nor the current Prime Minister is likely to disagree with the<br />
army over major matters in the near term, the fact that Ennahdha made this an issue<br />
suggests that they are sensitive to the future possibility <strong>of</strong> the military operating<br />
autonomously from the elected government, and interested in ensuring meaningful<br />
civilian oversight <strong>of</strong> the military.<br />
This concern bodes well for the future <strong>of</strong> civil-military relations in <strong>Tunisia</strong>. A<br />
common refrain we heard while in Tunis was that the country desperately needs strong<br />
institutions than can balance one another. One example <strong>of</strong> this is the desire for an<br />
opposition political party that would be strong enough to hold the present Ennahdha-led<br />
government accountable, and provide a clear alternative. Similarly, while the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n<br />
army’s behavior has overall been exemplary, over the long term <strong>Tunisia</strong> will need robust<br />
civilian control <strong>of</strong> the military to ensure that the military continues to play a positive role,<br />
particularly if in the future the army were to come under less enlightened leadership.<br />
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