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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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intermediary preventing the Ennahdha Movement from turning <strong>Tunisia</strong> into an Islamist<br />

nation, standing against the threat <strong>of</strong> creating a new Afghanistan or Iran. Western capital<br />

that therefore poured into <strong>Tunisia</strong> in the form <strong>of</strong> military aid, preferential trade<br />

agreements with Europe and strong political relations with Western nations, all served to<br />

strengthen Ben Ali’s regime, and, while calls for political reform from outside were far<br />

from uncommon, in reality there were very few real conditions or constraints placed on<br />

the President or his single-party.<br />

Heads <strong>of</strong> state from France, Italy, Spain and Germany all visited Tunis in the<br />

immediate aftermath <strong>of</strong> 9/11, and in 2003 the association culminated in German Interior<br />

Minister Otto Schily signing an agreement on increased cooperation in fighting organized<br />

crime and terrorism (Report <strong>of</strong> the March 2011 Delegation <strong>of</strong> Attorneys to <strong>Tunisia</strong>, 10).<br />

By the middle <strong>of</strong> the last decade, therefore, <strong>Tunisia</strong> had some <strong>of</strong> the harshest and most<br />

heavily enforced anti-terrorism laws in the Arab World, which were applied stringently to<br />

political opponents coming from Islamist movements, including both Ennahdha and the<br />

salafi movement.<br />

“Ennahdha has the stance <strong>of</strong> victims,” the secularist politicians whine, seeking to<br />

explain the strong victory <strong>of</strong> the Islamist party in the elections for the Constituent<br />

Assembly—and it is true that much <strong>of</strong> the legitimacy that Ennahdha lays claim to as an<br />

opposition power comes from the strong and <strong>of</strong>ten violent treatment that its members<br />

received from the regime, including the exile <strong>of</strong> its leaders and the torture and<br />

imprisonment <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong> its members, <strong>of</strong>ten after visibly unfair trials. But this treatment<br />

was not limited to Ennahdha, and, while the salafi are admittedly much less mainstream,<br />

and their actions <strong>of</strong>ten considered more counter to the general public good in many<br />

cases—there remained a sense immediately after the revolution that all <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong> had<br />

suffered under the repression, and, regardless <strong>of</strong> ideology, all <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns should<br />

experience their freedom. As Mokhtar Trifi, the head <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n Human Rights<br />

League (LTDH), himself has argued, the League demanded the release <strong>of</strong> everyone,<br />

because the conditions that surrounded their trials were universally poor, and as such,<br />

irrespective <strong>of</strong> their guilt, they cannot be considered legally imprisoned (SAIS Group<br />

Meeting, 24 January <strong>2012</strong>).<br />

166

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