Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

(IFES) polling data from May 2011, 18 less than half of eligible voters could identify that
the elections were for a constituent assembly and not a legislature or executive. This lack
of public awareness, combined with the closed-list system, has led some to suggest that
the NCA began its mandate with a “credibility deficit” (Pickard 2011, 641).
The NCA’s mandate is to write the new constitution and to prepare the country
for presidential or parliamentary elections in November 2012, depending on what the
agreed institutional arrangements call far. Beyond this mandate, the scope of what the
NCA can do is not completely clear. It is also a sovereign body that has semi-legislative
powers that can enable it to determine how the country is governed in the interim. As
Pickard notes, this has given rise to the unusual situation of sovereign authority being
placed in a constituent assembly (Pickard 2011, 642). Referring back to the literature on
this subject, this dual mandate may negatively impact the success of the constitutionwriting
process since it almost requires posturing for the upcoming elections in
November through its semi-legislative powers, possibly resulting in the neglect in the
constitution. The dual mandate means that the NCA’s legitimacy and efficacy face
another challenge. The expectations of swift change in the day-to-day lives of normal
Tunisians have been soaring at a higher-level than can be met in such a short time
following the ousting of the previous regime. Economic and social issues are pressing,
and having the same body try to tackle these and write a constitution may affect the
legitimacy that the public is willing to give to the constitution if the NCA has failed to
make progress in tackling these issues.
Following the elections, the first item on the NCA’s agenda was to determine how
it would function internally before beginning work on drafting constitutional articles. The
representatives of Ettakatol and some other parties were keen, at this stage, to form a
‘Government of National Interests’ in the NCA, or a grand coalition of the vast majority
of the seats in the assembly. However, they were unable to reach a unanimous agreement,
and so the ‘troika’ was formed, and government positions were divided among the three
18 “Tunisia Voter Registration and Voter Confidence Assessment Survey.” IFES. May 2011.
Cited in McCurdy, Daphne. 2011. ‘A Guide to the Tunisian Elections.’ Project on Middle East
Democracy. p. 16.
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