Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

The focus of civil society groups in Tunis on rights and on the constitution is
understandable given Tunisia’s long history of authoritarianism and repression. Without a
vigilant civil society to protect against abuses, the Islamists might feel more emboldened
to please their more conservative constituents by enshrining more traditional values in the
constitution, including turning back the clock on women’s rights. 25 But keeping the
primary focus on rights 26 —not on the economic issues with which most of the population
is most concerned—is not helping the perception that civil society, at least in the capital
Tunis, is dominated by left-wing elite groups: professors, intellectuals, and lawyers. It
seems as if, to an extent, the “elite civil society” in Tunis has not yet adapted to a post-
Ben Ali world and sees its role as remaining in steadfast opposition, vigilant towards any
signs of repression or denial of basic rights.
Overall, after the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the independent civil society in
Tunisia has developed impressively in a very short time. The two main poles of civil
society in the country—the grassroots civil society of the interior focused on local
development and civic engagement, and the elite civil society of Tunis who have taken
more of a rights-based watchdog role—could prove to be complementary in Tunisia’s
democratic development. As we saw with our introductory comparison between ATED
and UTICA, civil society is by no means uniform, but is nonetheless unified in its role of
serving as a channel for citizens’ interests and as a check on state power. Over time, with
the benefit of social media, civil society will benefit from the consolidation of interests
that naturally comes from linkages across organizations and regions. And, finally, the
development of a robust civil society that can aid in the country’s development and
enrich its democracy takes time. Considering that it has been only one year since the fall
of a regime that had as a central strategy the co-option and repression of civil society, we
can be cautiously optimistic that an effective civil society is in the making.
25 In fact, few civil society actors or Tunisia observers really know whether Nahdha’s promises
that they will work to protect gains in women’s rights are genuine, or are simply paying lipservice
to liberals and will be reneged on once they become more powerful.
26 A recent poll of Tunisian citizens (by “I Watch”) revealed that Tunisians were not very
concerned with the constitution-writing process but were much more interested in tangible issues
such as security or jobs.
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