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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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nip in the bud any challenges to party authority. Understandably, civil society in <strong>Tunisia</strong>,<br />

under the constant gaze <strong>of</strong> security forces and party members, atrophied. For most<br />

citizens, participating meaningfully in associational life simply wasn’t worth the risks <strong>of</strong><br />

imprisonment or torture.<br />

To ensure that civil society groups were not working “against the national<br />

consensus,” Ben Ali and the ruling RCD used a number <strong>of</strong> distinct mechanisms <strong>of</strong><br />

control. The Interior Ministry, in addition to granting permits to civil society groups, also<br />

provided funding to those groups whose loyalty they hoped to shore up. Ben Ali’s<br />

government provided the funds to build headquarters for UTICA, as has been mentioned,<br />

as well as for the Union de Femmes Démocrates, a group which prided itself on its<br />

independence. In some cases, when an association became effective in contesting the<br />

regime—such as the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n Human Rights League (LTDH)—the regime would create<br />

a duplicate organization, fund it and provide its membership from the party ranks in an<br />

attempt to reduce the influence <strong>of</strong> the original association.<br />

A crucial shift came when the government amended the Law <strong>of</strong> Associations in<br />

1992, forbidding any association <strong>of</strong> a “general character” from denying membership to<br />

any person who pr<strong>of</strong>esses to ascribe to the organization’s ideals and mission. The law<br />

allowed the RCD to infiltrate NGOs by flooding their ranks with party loyalists who<br />

would report on any activities or plans that were disagreeable to the party. Members <strong>of</strong><br />

civil society organizations with whom we met in Kairouan reported having to inform<br />

government <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> all meetings <strong>of</strong> more than two people and provide the time and<br />

location <strong>of</strong> all meetings along with a list <strong>of</strong> names <strong>of</strong> all persons in attendance. As the<br />

internet and then social media became a natural forum for organizing, the regime closely<br />

monitored the activities <strong>of</strong> known activists. One pr<strong>of</strong>essor and member <strong>of</strong> the Femmes<br />

Démocrates reported having forwarded a message through Facebook in 2009 about a<br />

rumor concerning regime behavior and the next day being called to meet with the<br />

judiciary police—she was subsequently sentenced to 8 months house arrest (SAIS Group<br />

Meeting, 23 January <strong>2012</strong>). Most citizens, however, preferred simply to avoid<br />

confrontation rather than risking scrutiny from the regime’s security forces. A group <strong>of</strong><br />

university students in Tunis all agreed that before the revolution their life revolved<br />

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