Arthur R. Butz – The Hoax Of The Twentieth Century

Chapter 5: The Hungarian Jews
moval of 400,000 or more non-Budapest Jews in the spring of 1944 would have
entailed the removal of essentially all non-Budapest Jews. Not only could this not
have failed to be noticed by the Red Cross delegation, it is also difficult to see
where the “one hundred thousand Jews” who “poured into Budapest from the
provinces” in November could have come from. 277
There are other arguments against the extermination claims. First, it will be
seen that the charges specify that special arrangements were made at a conference
in Vienna in early May to provide four trains per day to effect these deportations,
and that the trains were in fact provided on schedule. That is, in the crucial few
weeks before and after D-Day (June 6), at a time of desperate rail shortages, with
both fronts threatening to collapse, the Germans provided an amount of extra rail
transportation that would strain the resources of any rail system under the best of
circumstances. That is just not believable. It is worth remembering that the rail
journey from Budapest to Auschwitz is much more formidable than the map
might suggest, on account of the mountains in eastern Czechoslovakia.
Where are the pictures
A second additional argument against the charges relate to the question, often
asked, why did not the Allies attempt to bomb the gas chambers that, by the time
of the alleged killings of Hungarian Jews, the whole world “knew” about The
question can be considerably broadened.
On June 8, 1944, the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force, based in southern Italy, was ordered
to emphasize oil targets in its bombings, and was given a list of specific oil
targets in eastern and southeastern Europe. The principal target and the one that
received the major share of attention was the Ploesti area in Romania. However,
Auschwitz, which was also one of the targets on the list, was first bombed on August
20 and was subsequently bombed in September and December. 278
Now in the Allied bombing operations in World War II it was customary to
make extensive use of photographic intelligence. One objective was the assessment
of damage done by attacks and another was the planning of attacks: determining
whether or not the target was worth attacking and also determining the extent
and nature of the defenses in the area of the target. 279 It is a certainty that intelligence
had photographed Auschwitz and the surrounding area, rather thoroughly,
soon after the June 8 order. In this case the Americans should have been
able to provide actual photographs of all these Hungarian Jews being moved into
Auschwitz and shot and burned out in the open. They should not even have been
obliged to take any special measures to produce for us, either at the time of the alleged
killings or at the later trials, photographic evidence for their claims. Of
course, to have been fully convincing, the former time should have been chosen,
277
278
279
Ruppin, 30-31, 68.
Craven, 280-302, 641f; Carter (see Index under “Auschwitz”).
C. B. Smith, 167.
187