Arthur R. Butz – The Hoax Of The Twentieth Century

Arthur R. Butz, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century
of the organized exodus of Jews from Europe. 404
In August 1946, LaGuardia fired Morgan for charging that UNRRA served as
“an umbrella covering Russian secret agents and criminal elements engaged in
wholesale dope-peddling and smuggling.” Morgan was replaced by Meyer Cohen
of the Washington office of UNRRA. This action was taken at a time when there
was a great deal of well-publicized conflict between UNRRA and military authorities
in Germany. LaGuardia had come to Germany at the time, in order to
deal with various problems, Morgan being one of them. At a news conference
held immediately after he fired Morgan, LaGuardia had an angry exchange with
Hal Foust of the Chicago Tribune, whom we encountered in Chapter 1 (p. 45).
Foust had asked how much money nations other than the U.S. had contributed to
UNRRA. LaGuardia, however, would answer none of Foust’s questions, on the
grounds that Foust’s “dirty, lousy paper would not print it anyway.” To Foust’s
repeated requests for the information, LaGuardia shrieked “Shut up!” 405
Morgan had not been the first high ranking Allied officer to collide with the
Zionists. In the summer of 1945, the “Harrison report” to the White House had asserted
that Jews in the U.S. zone in Germany were treated almost as badly as they
had been under the Nazis. Although many Jews in the camps publicly ridiculed
these claims, General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, visited General
George S. Patton, Jr. (U.S. Third Army commander and military governor of
Bavaria), and “read the riot act to him and astounded him by saying that he meant
it when he said that Germans were to be ousted from their homes, if necessary, to
make their victims comfortable.” Shortly later, Eisenhower relieved Patton of his
duties, allegedly because Patton had said in public that too much fuss was being
made about ousting Nazis from key positions, that the distinction between Nazis
and non-Nazis was similar to the distinction between Republicans and Democrats,
and that the key to a successful occupation of Germany lay in showing the Germans
“what grand fellows we are.” This was just the most publicized instance of
the widespread “reluctance of occupation authorities on the operational level to
act as tough as the policies enunciated by the heads of state in Berlin and by General
Eisenhower himself.” Patton was assigned to command a group writing a
military history, but he was in an automobile accident in December 1945 and died
two weeks later from complications. 406
Eisenhower’s attitude toward Zionists had always been most friendly. Shortly
before the end of the war, the Zionist organizer Ruth Klieger, a native of Romania
who had emigrated to Palestine before the war, had visited Eisenhower’s SHAEF
headquarters in Paris in order to explain to Judge Rifkind, Eisenhower’s adviser
on DP matters, her mission of organizing transports of Jews to Palestine from
Germany. She was made a U.S. Army colonel on the spot and given the papers
necessary for her mission in Germany. Eisenhower’s services did not end there,
because the troop transport ship Ascania, owned by SHAEF and manned under
orders from Eisenhower’s command, was then put at the disposal of the Zionists,
404
405
406
278
Kimche & Kimche, 88-89; John & Hadawi, vol. 2, 23-26, 34-36; Morgenthau Diary, 79.
New York Times (Aug. 14, 1946), 10; (Aug. 21, 1946), 1, 5; (Aug. 23, 1946), 18.
New York Times (Oct. 1, 1945), 2; (Oct. 2, 1945), 1; (Oct. 3, 1945), 1.