Arthur R. Butz – The Hoax Of The Twentieth Century

Chapter 3: Washington and New York
During the late summer and autumn of 1942, Wise had continuously campaigned
for the Allied governments to take a public position directly condemning
the alleged exterminations of Jews in Europe. On December 8, 1942, Wise led a
delegation to the White House and presented to President Roosevelt a twentypage
document entitled Blue Print for Extermination, which was based on the sort
of “information” we have reviewed. Related Jewish pressures finally brought capitulation
to Wise on the mythical exterminations, and on December 17, 1942, the
Allies, led by Washington, issued a statement condemning the exterminations. A
related statement, released two days later, claimed exterminations at Belzec and at
Chelmno, but Auschwitz was not mentioned (the relevant news stories are reviewed
below).
Despite this public declaration, the group headed by J. Breckenridge Long
continued to resist the propaganda. On January 19, 1943, Riegner gave Harrison
the “information” that “in one place in Poland 6,000 Jews are killed daily.” On
January 21, Harrison communicated this material to the State Department and also
to certain unspecified “private Jewish agencies,” apparently meaning Wise. The
message was merely filed, and the Department made no public mention of it. For
a time, the private Jewish agencies were also silent about the message. On February
10, Long’s group took a further step in suppression of such propaganda. In a
message signed by Welles (who is said to have not read the message) and with
particular reference to Harrison’s cable of January 21, it instructed Harrison:
“in the future, reports submitted to you for transmission to private persons
in the United States should not be accepted unless extraordinary circumstances
make such action advisable. It is felt that by sending such private messages
which circumvent neutral countries’ censorship we risk the possibility
that neutral countries might find it necessary to take steps to curtail or abolish
our official secret means of communication.”
Finally, on February 14, the New York Times published the story (see below).
For explanation of the delay of four weeks in publishing the story, despite its being
received by “private Jewish agencies” on January 21, and despite the evident
policy of publishing the unsupported claims of such agencies, we can only conjecture
that certain unknown persons were hoping that the State Department, given
the precedent of the declaration of December 17, would release the “information”
so as to confer a greater credibility than would have been granted to the story as it
eventually appeared: a claim indistinguishable in terms of authority from the average
sort of atrocity claim.
The Treasury (which, because of Morgenthau’s long crusade against Germany,
had repeatedly interfered in the conduct of foreign affairs since at least 1936 131 )
was soon to come into conflict with State over this suppression. A second and
more substantial basis for conflict between the two Departments was also established
in February 1943. It was learned that the Romanian government was prepared
to transfer 70,000 Jews to Palestine on Romanian ships bearing Vatican insignia
(it is unlikely that the Romanians really cared where the Jews were sent, so
131
Hull, 471-473.
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