Arthur R. Butz – The Hoax Of The Twentieth Century

Chapter 3: Washington and New York
them the embodiment of a nemesis. They each and all believe every person,
everywhere, has a right to come to the United States. I believe nobody, anywhere
has a right to enter the United States unless the United States desires.”
The State Department either procrastinated on the matter or actively sabotaged
the proposed project. At the end of the summer of 1943, it was learned that 6,000
Jewish children could be taken out of France, and this possibility got involved in
the problem.
The people from the Treasury and the World Jewish Congress kept pressing
for the proposed projects and continually asserted, with apparent complete seriousness,
that the only alternative was the death of the people in question at the
hands of Hitler. It was even openly charged that the failure to approve the projects
was “acquiescence of this Government in the murder of the Jews.” Pressure was
also put on the British by various people. Long had become a whipping boy both
publicly and within government circles, and he wrote bitterly that
“the Jewish agitation depends on attacking some individual. Otherwise
they would have no publicity. So for the time being I am the bull’s eye.”
As a result of this campaign, Wise and Morgenthau achieved a breakthrough in
December 1943, when arrangements were finally made for the evacuation of Romanian
Jews and money was put into a Swiss account controlled by Riegner and
the U.S. Treasury. Moreover, in December 1943, Romania put out peace feelers
and was assured it would be treated well if it treated its Jews well; Romania immediately
decided to repatriate Jews it had resettled by the Sea of Azov in Russia.
This Morgenthau victory had been achieved at a December 20 meeting of
Hull, Long, Morgenthau, and John Pehle, chief of the Treasury’s Foreign Funds
Control. Morgenthau had evidently decided on a showdown with State over the
entire matter, for at that meeting he casually requested a copy of the complete text
of the February 10 message from Welles to Harrison (the suppression instruction).
The State Department complied, but deleted the reference to Harrison’s message
of January 21, thereby causing the message of February 10 to appear utterly routine.
In thus editing the message, State was obviously unaware that the complete
contents of this correspondence had already been leaked to DuBois in the Treasury
by Donald Hiss of the State Department (brother of Alger Hiss and later identified
in Bentley-Chambers testimony as a Communist, although he denied it),
who had acquired copies of the messages only with great difficulty and, in complying
with DuBois’ request, nevertheless cautioned the latter that the messages
were “none of Treasury’s business” and that Hiss could lose his job for the
leak. 132
When Morgenthau received the edited message, he knew that he had another
weapon to use against Long and associates, and thus, he brought on a collision by
charging editing of the message and demanding to see the unedited files, which
were produced shortly later, exposing State’s clumsy attempt at concealment. The
State Department people were now very much on the defensive, and further examination
of the State Department files (which the Treasury was now in a position
132
Morgenthau Diary, 6.
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