Arthur R. Butz – The Hoax Of The Twentieth Century

Chapter 3: Washington and New York
the indubitable fact that there were all sorts of rumors current, shows that the Jews
were not conscious of any extermination program. When they were told to pack
up for transport, they did just that, and went without resistance. On p. 140 we
shall note Theresienstadt Jews volunteering for transport to Auschwitz as late as
August 1944, for the Jews at Theresienstadt knew nothing of any extermination
program at Auschwitz or anywhere else. On p. 262 we shall note that the Nazis
were allegedly even unwilling to commit anything to confidential documents for,
we are told, ‘the drafting of circumspect minutes was one of the major arts of Hitler’s
Reich.’ Because this is the case put forward by the extermination mythologists,
then it is not merely that occurrences of the sort of remarks under consideration
do not support their case; the problem becomes that of explaining such occurrences.
(c) The Goebbels remark should be seen for what it was: a professional propagandist’s
reaction to the Allied bombings, which obsessed German policy in various
ways from May 1940 on. Because the facts in this connection, although well
established, are not well known, they are very briefly summarized here, but in order
to avoid an inexcusably long digression, the summary is indeed brief. The
reader interested in more thorough treatment is referred to Veale and to Colby. 142
At the outbreak of war in 1939, German air doctrine viewed the bomber as a
form of artillery and thus a weapon to be used in support of ordinary ground operations.
It was in this connection that the well-publicized bombings of Warsaw in
1939 and Rotterdam in May 1940 took place: only after these cities had actually
become the scenes of military operations and the laws of siege applied. “Strategic
bombing,” as we understand the term, played no role in German combat operations
(although of course it had been and was under study by German military
planners).
This was not the case in Britain, however, for at the time that the Germans
were using their bombers as artillery in the Netherlands, the British made the
“splendid decision” to bomb German civilian targets, knowing perfectly well that
Hitler had no intention or wish to engage in warfare of this sort (Hitler, indeed,
did not want war with Britain at all).
There was a moderate amount of German bombing of targets in England during
the early summer of 1940, but only specifically military targets were attacked,
even while such cities as Hamburg and Bremen were undergoing general attack. It
was only after three months of this, and with the greatest reluctance, that Hitler
felt himself forced to reply in kind, and in this way the well publicized “Blitz”
hoax was established. The British people were not permitted to find out that their
government could have stopped the German raids at any time merely by stopping
the raids on Germany.
The British raids on Germany, while of no military significance in 1940, had
put the German government on the spot in German popular opinion, because the
German people naturally thought that their government should be able to do
something about them. The only reason the Germans adopted retaliatory bombing
142
Frederick J. P. Veale, Advance to Barbarism, and Benjamin Colby, ‘Twas a Famous Victory.
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