ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide - Army Electronic ...
ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide - Army Electronic ...
ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide - Army Electronic ...
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Troop Leading Procedures<br />
<strong>and</strong> status of their equipment. It also includes underst<strong>and</strong>ing the full array of assets in support of the unit.<br />
Leaders know, for example, how much indirect fire will become available, <strong>and</strong> when it is available, they<br />
will know the type. They consider any new limitations based on the level of training or recent fighting.<br />
Time Available<br />
5-36. Leaders not only appreciate how much time is available, they underst<strong>and</strong> the time-space aspects of<br />
preparing, moving, fighting, <strong>and</strong> sustaining. They view their own tasks <strong>and</strong> enemy actions in relation to<br />
time. They know how long it takes under such conditions to prepare for certain tasks (such as orders<br />
production, rehearsals, <strong>and</strong> subordinate element preparations). Most important, leaders monitor the time<br />
available. As events occur, they assess their impact on the unit timeline <strong>and</strong> update previous timelines for<br />
their subordinates. Timelines list all events that affect the unit <strong>and</strong> its subordinate elements.<br />
Civil Considerations<br />
5-37. Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, <strong>and</strong> activities<br />
of the civilian leaders, populations, <strong>and</strong> organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of<br />
military operations (FM 6-0). Rarely are military operations conducted in uninhabited areas. Most of the<br />
time, units are surrounded by noncombatants. These noncombatants include residents of the AO, local<br />
officials, <strong>and</strong> governmental <strong>and</strong> nongovernmental organizations. Based on information from higher<br />
headquarters <strong>and</strong> their own knowledge <strong>and</strong> judgment, leaders identify civil considerations that affect their<br />
mission. (See FM 6-0 <strong>and</strong> FM 3-05.401.) <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong>er</strong>s analyze civil considerations a using the six factors<br />
known by the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, <strong>and</strong> events.<br />
Course of Action Development<br />
5-38. Mission analysis provides information needed to develop COAs. COA development aims to<br />
determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission. At lower echelons, the mission may be a single<br />
task. Most missions <strong>and</strong> tasks can be accomplished in more than one way. Normally, leaders develop two<br />
or more COAs. However, in a time-constrained environment, they may develop only one. Leaders do not<br />
wait for a complete order before beginning COA development. Usable COAs are suitable, feasible,<br />
acceptable, distinguishable, <strong>and</strong> complete. Leaders develop COAs as soon as they have enough information<br />
to do so. To develop COAs, leaders focus on the actions the unit takes at the objective <strong>and</strong> conduct a<br />
reverse plan to the starting point.<br />
Analyze Relative Combat Power<br />
5-39. During COA development, leaders determine whether the unit has enough combat power to defeat<br />
the force (or accomplish a task in stability or civil support operations) against which it is arrayed by<br />
comparing the combat power of friendly <strong>and</strong> enemy forces. Leaders seek to determine where, when, <strong>and</strong><br />
how friendly combat power (the elements of intelligence, movement <strong>and</strong> maneuver, fires, sustainment,<br />
protection, <strong>and</strong> mission comm<strong>and</strong>) can overwhelm the enemy. It is a particularly difficult process if the unit<br />
is fighting a dissimilar unit. For example, if the unit is attacking or defending against an enemy mechanized<br />
force as opposed to a similarly equipped light infantry force. Below battalion level, relative combat power<br />
comparisons are rough <strong>and</strong> generally rely on professional judgment instead of numerical analysis. When an<br />
enemy is not the object of a particular mission or tasks, leaders conduct a troop-to-task analysis to<br />
determine if they have enough combat power to accomplish the tasks. For example, a company comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />
assigned the task “establish civil control in town X” would need to determine if they had enough Soldiers<br />
<strong>and</strong> equipment (to include vehicles <strong>and</strong> barrier materials) to establish the necessary check points <strong>and</strong><br />
security stations within the town to control the population in town X.<br />
Generate Options<br />
5-40. During this step, leaders brainstorm different ways to accomplish the mission. They determine the<br />
doctrinal requirements for the operation, including the tactical tasks normally assigned to subordinates.<br />
Doctrinal requirements give leaders a framework from which to develop COAs.<br />
14 September 2011 <strong>ATTP</strong> 5-<strong>0.1</strong> 5-7