ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide - Army Electronic ...
ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide - Army Electronic ...
ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide - Army Electronic ...
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The Military Decisionmaking Process<br />
with enemy maneuver battalion equivalents. Planners then compare friendly strengths against enemy<br />
weaknesses, <strong>and</strong> vice versa, for each element of combat power. From these comparisons, they may deduce<br />
particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploited or may need protection. These comparisons<br />
provide planners insight into effective force employment.<br />
4-85. In troop-to-task analysis for stability <strong>and</strong> civil support operations, staffs determine relative combat<br />
power by comparing available resources to specified or implied stability or civil support tasks. This<br />
analysis provides insight as available options <strong>and</strong> needed resources. In such operations, the elements of<br />
sustainment, movement <strong>and</strong> maneuver, nonlethal effects, <strong>and</strong> information may dominate.<br />
4-86. By analyzing force ratios <strong>and</strong> determining <strong>and</strong> comparing each force’s strengths <strong>and</strong> weaknesses as a<br />
function of combat power, planners can gain insight into—<br />
� Friendly capabilities that pertain to the operation.<br />
� The types of operations possible from both friendly <strong>and</strong> enemy perspectives.<br />
� How <strong>and</strong> where the enemy may be vulnerable.<br />
� How <strong>and</strong> where friendly forces are vulnerable.<br />
� Additional resources needed to execute the mission.<br />
� How to allocate existing resources.<br />
4-87. Planners must not develop <strong>and</strong> recommend COAs based solely on mathematical analysis of force<br />
ratios. Although the process uses some numerical relationships, the estimate is largely subjective.<br />
Assessing combat power requires assessing both tangible <strong>and</strong> intangible factors, such as morale <strong>and</strong> levels<br />
of training. A relative combat power assessment identifies exploitable enemy weaknesses, identifies<br />
unprotected friendly weaknesses, <strong>and</strong> determines the combat power necessary to conduct essential stability<br />
or civil support tasks.<br />
Generate Options<br />
4-88. Based on the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s guidance <strong>and</strong> the initial results of the relative combat power assessment,<br />
the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential<br />
stability tasks. In an unconstrained environment, planners aim to develop several possible COAs.<br />
Depending on available time, comm<strong>and</strong>ers may limit the options in the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s guidance. Options<br />
focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption or on those stability tasks that are most<br />
essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.<br />
4-89. Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires time, imagination, <strong>and</strong><br />
creativity, but it produces the widest range of choices. The staff (<strong>and</strong> members of organizations outside the<br />
headquarters) remains unbiased <strong>and</strong> open-minded when developing proposed options.<br />
4-90. In developing COAs, staff members determine the doctrinal requirements for each proposed<br />
operation, including doctrinal tasks for subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires a<br />
breach force, a support force, <strong>and</strong> an assault force. Essential stability tasks require the ability to provide a<br />
level of civil security, civil control, <strong>and</strong> certain essential services. In addition, the staff considers the<br />
potential capabilities of attachments <strong>and</strong> other organizations <strong>and</strong> agencies outside military channels.<br />
4-91. When generating options, the staff starts with the decisive operation identified in the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s<br />
planning guidance. The staff checks that the decisive operation nests within the higher headquarters’<br />
concept of operations. The staff clarifies the decisive operation’s purpose <strong>and</strong> considers ways to mass the<br />
effects (lethal <strong>and</strong> nonlethal) of overwhelming combat power to achieve it.<br />
4-92. Next, the staff considers shaping operations. The staff establishes a purpose for each shaping<br />
operation tied to creating or preserving a condition for the decisive operation’s success. Shaping operations<br />
may occur before, concurrently with, or after the decisive operation. A shaping operation may be<br />
designated as the main effort if executed before or after the decisive operation.<br />
4-93. The staff then determines sustaining operations necessary to create <strong>and</strong> maintain the combat power<br />
required for the decisive operation <strong>and</strong> shaping operation. After developing the basic operational<br />
organization for a given COA, the staff then determines the essential tasks for each decisive, shaping, <strong>and</strong><br />
sustaining operation.<br />
14 September 2011 <strong>ATTP</strong> 5-<strong>0.1</strong> 4-17