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ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide - Army Electronic ...

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The Military Decisionmaking Process<br />

with enemy maneuver battalion equivalents. Planners then compare friendly strengths against enemy<br />

weaknesses, <strong>and</strong> vice versa, for each element of combat power. From these comparisons, they may deduce<br />

particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploited or may need protection. These comparisons<br />

provide planners insight into effective force employment.<br />

4-85. In troop-to-task analysis for stability <strong>and</strong> civil support operations, staffs determine relative combat<br />

power by comparing available resources to specified or implied stability or civil support tasks. This<br />

analysis provides insight as available options <strong>and</strong> needed resources. In such operations, the elements of<br />

sustainment, movement <strong>and</strong> maneuver, nonlethal effects, <strong>and</strong> information may dominate.<br />

4-86. By analyzing force ratios <strong>and</strong> determining <strong>and</strong> comparing each force’s strengths <strong>and</strong> weaknesses as a<br />

function of combat power, planners can gain insight into—<br />

� Friendly capabilities that pertain to the operation.<br />

� The types of operations possible from both friendly <strong>and</strong> enemy perspectives.<br />

� How <strong>and</strong> where the enemy may be vulnerable.<br />

� How <strong>and</strong> where friendly forces are vulnerable.<br />

� Additional resources needed to execute the mission.<br />

� How to allocate existing resources.<br />

4-87. Planners must not develop <strong>and</strong> recommend COAs based solely on mathematical analysis of force<br />

ratios. Although the process uses some numerical relationships, the estimate is largely subjective.<br />

Assessing combat power requires assessing both tangible <strong>and</strong> intangible factors, such as morale <strong>and</strong> levels<br />

of training. A relative combat power assessment identifies exploitable enemy weaknesses, identifies<br />

unprotected friendly weaknesses, <strong>and</strong> determines the combat power necessary to conduct essential stability<br />

or civil support tasks.<br />

Generate Options<br />

4-88. Based on the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s guidance <strong>and</strong> the initial results of the relative combat power assessment,<br />

the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential<br />

stability tasks. In an unconstrained environment, planners aim to develop several possible COAs.<br />

Depending on available time, comm<strong>and</strong>ers may limit the options in the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s guidance. Options<br />

focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption or on those stability tasks that are most<br />

essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.<br />

4-89. Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires time, imagination, <strong>and</strong><br />

creativity, but it produces the widest range of choices. The staff (<strong>and</strong> members of organizations outside the<br />

headquarters) remains unbiased <strong>and</strong> open-minded when developing proposed options.<br />

4-90. In developing COAs, staff members determine the doctrinal requirements for each proposed<br />

operation, including doctrinal tasks for subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires a<br />

breach force, a support force, <strong>and</strong> an assault force. Essential stability tasks require the ability to provide a<br />

level of civil security, civil control, <strong>and</strong> certain essential services. In addition, the staff considers the<br />

potential capabilities of attachments <strong>and</strong> other organizations <strong>and</strong> agencies outside military channels.<br />

4-91. When generating options, the staff starts with the decisive operation identified in the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s<br />

planning guidance. The staff checks that the decisive operation nests within the higher headquarters’<br />

concept of operations. The staff clarifies the decisive operation’s purpose <strong>and</strong> considers ways to mass the<br />

effects (lethal <strong>and</strong> nonlethal) of overwhelming combat power to achieve it.<br />

4-92. Next, the staff considers shaping operations. The staff establishes a purpose for each shaping<br />

operation tied to creating or preserving a condition for the decisive operation’s success. Shaping operations<br />

may occur before, concurrently with, or after the decisive operation. A shaping operation may be<br />

designated as the main effort if executed before or after the decisive operation.<br />

4-93. The staff then determines sustaining operations necessary to create <strong>and</strong> maintain the combat power<br />

required for the decisive operation <strong>and</strong> shaping operation. After developing the basic operational<br />

organization for a given COA, the staff then determines the essential tasks for each decisive, shaping, <strong>and</strong><br />

sustaining operation.<br />

14 September 2011 <strong>ATTP</strong> 5-<strong>0.1</strong> 4-17

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