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hitherto not too receptive legal circles. Although “in his thought there is little that
is either original or unique” (p. 70), it was Sabzavar\’s “training in the revived
philosophical tradition of Mulla Sadra (d. c. 1045/1635) […] that established the intellectual
hegemony of the philosophical system known as hikma muta^aliya that
dominates the hawza (at least in Iran) to this day” (pp. 52–53,). Rizvi assesses the
crucial role played by Sabzavar\’s students, such as the prominent marja^ Murtada
Ansar\ (d. 1281/1864), in propagating the Sadrian tradition. It is through
them, concludes Rizvi, that Sabzavar\ influenced “the metaphysical shift […]
noticeable in the procedural principles in jurisprudence (usul ^amaliyya)”, thus
making “the teaching of philosophy more acceptable in Najaf, a centre of learning
traditionally hostile to philosophy” (p. 63, brackets are the reviewer’s).
Established by M\rza Mahd\ Isfahan\ (d. 1365/1946) and Sayyid Musa Zarabad\
(d. 1353/1932) in the first half of the 20 th century, the Maktab-i Tafkik (“The
School of Separation”) has been considered a sort of modern version of the
Akhbariyya legal school. In his contribution titled “Continuity and Originality in
Shi^i Thought: the Relationship between the Akhbariyya and the Maktab-i Tafkik”
(pp. 71–92), Robert Gleave, also of the University of Exeter, describes the Maktab-i
Tafkik as “an interesting example of a reform school which claims a version
of Shi^i heritage in which the sciences of philosophy (falsafa), mysticism (tasawwuf),
or more precisely, philosophical informed mystical contemplation (^irfan)
are subjected to an enforced separation (tafkik) from any exploration of religious
truths” (p. 71). The Maktab, according to Gleave, is not hostile to philosophy and
mysticism as such, but maintains “that the three means to gain knowledge (philosophy,
intuition and revelation) are quite distinct (or separate, tafkik). Any attempt
to mix them […] is fundamentally misguided” (p. 74).
Gleave then debates whether the Maktab can be seen as a continuation of
Akhbarism and offers a brilliant analysis of specific points of doctrine. Despite
clear similarities between the two schools, he argues for the implausibility of a direct
and conscious connection: Akhbarism was above all concerned with jurisprudential
matters (i.e. rejection of ijtihad) whereas the Maktab, which adheres to
the usuli definition of ijtihad, is best described as a theological movement.
The second section opens with Sabrina Mervin’s “La quête du savoir à Najaf.
Les études religieuses chez le chiites imamites de la fin du 19è siècle à 1960”
(pp. 95–112). The various aspects of the Najaf-based hawza education system
before the period of political and cultural transformations that were to impact
heavily on its organization are here examined. Mervin vividly describes the peculiar
lifestyle of students and teachers, illustrates the different stages of scholarly
training, and lists the fundamental texts which formed the core of religious learning.
Rightly pointing out the hawza’s state-independent, accessfree character and
typical informality, she concludes that “Najaf diffère radicalement des grandes