Buiten kerk en moskee

section, we will look to the future and discuss how developments in religious diversity
could affect cleavages and social cohesion in the future.
Socio-cultural cleavages
One way in which a socio-cultural cleavage can manifest itself is in the differences in norms
and values that arise from differences in the ideological or religious beliefs of Muslims,
Christians and non-believers. The religious cleavage is anything but new. For example, at
the height of pillarisation, there were four groups that had barely any contact with each
other. Each of these groups was united in its own organisations (differentiation), and their
members felt an emphatic and emotional connection with their own group (identification).
Each group was also clearly visible as a distinct group in the political world (representation).
Thus, the ‘social cleavage’ qualification seemed appropriate at that time. Despite
being a very difficult question to answer – we do not have a crystal ball – we ask ourselves
which socio-cultural cleavages could exist between ideological groups in the future based
on current insights.
What is often seen as a dominant culture in the Netherlands is unmistakeably increasingly
being characterised by secularisation and, as such, possibly also by individualisation, as the
church and religious communities are now able to exercise less influence on the choices
that individuals make and there are no clear substitutes for them yet. Both Christians and
Muslims (and other religious groups) in the Netherlands are regarded as ‘cultural minorities’.
This ‘minority stress’ could explain why we are seeing an increase in religiosity in
young Muslims and young churchgoers in the first two reports of this trilogy. Living in one
of the most secular societies in the world, with views and behaviour that are sometimes
inconsistent with their faith, young Muslims (Huijnk 2018: 16) and young churchgoers (De
Hart and Van Houwelingen 2018: 54) are more determined to live life in line with their faith
as much as possible. With religious diversity increasing (in comparison with a century ago,
for example, when almost everyone was Christian) and advancing individualisation, further
religious revitalisation – in other words, a more intensive experience of faith – would not
seem unlikely. This revitalisation is geographically concentrated too: applying particularly
among young Muslims in specific areas in the (big) cities (Dagevos 2009) and young
churchgoers in the Bible belt. As such, it cannot be ruled out that a deeper socio-cultural
cleavage could develop between these religious groups and the rest of the Netherlands –
which is predominantly and probably also increasingly more secular. Regionalisation could
be an additional factor in this. Bridging and other contact between individuals in these
groups could blur cleavages.
The question is whether the cleavage between believers, Muslims and Christians in particular
will be as visible and patent as that between believers and non-believers. As orthodox
or other believers, they share a number of interests in a society that is otherwise predominantly
secular and becoming more and more so. For example, Jews and Muslims joined
forces with each other against the ban on ritual slaughter, and Christian leaders have indicated
they understand the emotions Muslims feel when the Prophet is insulted (Cliteur
159 c o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s o n t h r e e r e p o r t s