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page 160 chapter V
ture, circumspect, sensible) ethic of responsibility, I
would like to emphasise in the spirit of Max Weber that
the two styles of moral thinking form a single unit –
albeit one that is full of irresolvable tensions. This is
also the field of tension in which representatives of the
economy in general operate today.
In no way does the ethic of conviction equate with a
lack of responsibility, or the ethic of responsibility with
a lack of conviction. The follower of the ethic of responsibility
has not only moral convictions, but also
reckons with the familiar, average defects of his fellow
men, particularly with the fact there are also people
with immoral convictions. He does not feel in a position
to give others the blame for any bad consequences
of his own actions, insofar as he was able to foresee
them – not even if his actions appeared to be morally
correct (“with a clear conscience”). On the other hand,
the follower of the ethic of conviction feels responsible
solely for not compromising his moral standards under
any circumstances – even if this will have foreseeable,
negative effects on others: it is then not his fault. 7
Before now turning to “application” in banks, you have
the natural right at this point to know the speaker’s
philosophical standpoint. Based on my training in economics
and my professional experience, I think that
7 If a great moral wrong can be prevented only by the morally
questionable use of means, a decision-maker committed to the
ethic of responsibility would consider such use, whereas a
decision-maker committed to the ethic of conviction would not.
For example, which Members of the German Bundestag belong
to which “philosophical camp” could repeatedly be observed in
the past when it came to voting on particularly critical issues,
such as military missions of the Federal Armed Forces abroad.
It can likewise be seen that this standpoint can, however, also
change – entirely in the spirit of Max Weber.