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Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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- 100-<br />

to <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> war, Snijders suggested <strong>the</strong> telegram was a warning to keep careful<br />

watch on <strong>the</strong> situation in Germany, <strong>and</strong> Hubert van Tuyll used ano<strong>the</strong>r source to claim that<br />

"api api" referred to an impending German mobilisation. 12<br />

Again, only speculation is possible regarding <strong>the</strong> timing <strong>and</strong> actual meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

telegram. It is unknown what triggered Ie Roy to send <strong>the</strong> message so early in <strong>the</strong> July<br />

crisis, hours before <strong>the</strong> Serbian reply was despatched, before any signs <strong>of</strong> German<br />

mobilisation were visible, <strong>and</strong> before Russia declared its support for Serbia. 13 Van Tuyll<br />

provided some conceivable scenarios, including <strong>the</strong> possibility that Ie Roy witnessed early<br />

signs <strong>of</strong> German pre-mobilisation, that he intercepted sensitive information sent via <strong>the</strong><br />

telegraph station, or that he was notified by an informant. 14 Whatever Ie Roy discovered,<br />

<strong>and</strong> however he obtained <strong>the</strong> infonnation, must have been so pressing that he (or his<br />

informant) believed that whatever happened in <strong>the</strong> Balkans, <strong>and</strong> regardless <strong>of</strong> Serbia's<br />

answer to Austria-Hungary, <strong>the</strong>re was a strong chance <strong>of</strong> it turning into a conflict involving<br />

Germany. Le Roy would not have sent <strong>the</strong> message unless he believed <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

could possibly be at risk. "Api api" could not have referred to a localised Balkan conflict<br />

<strong>and</strong> would, almost certainly, have meant some form <strong>of</strong> German preparation for war because<br />

a conflict involving Austria-Hungary in <strong>the</strong> Balkans presented little direct threat to <strong>the</strong><br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s. The only l<strong>and</strong>-based continental power <strong>of</strong> serious concern to <strong>the</strong> neutral was<br />

its eastern neighbour. Of course, it is possible that Ie Roy acted on a hunch, or received a<br />

vague but unsettling message.<br />

No doubt, <strong>the</strong> telegram warned <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s that <strong>the</strong> situation in Europe was<br />

critical. Yet given its very early timing, its author is unlikely to have presaged inevitable<br />

conflict, unless he had infonnation on German intentions on exacerbating <strong>the</strong> crisis. The<br />

events that were pivotal to <strong>the</strong> outbreak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Great War - namely Serbian rejection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

Austria-Hungarian ultimatum, Russian support <strong>of</strong> Serbia, <strong>and</strong> German responses to both<br />

<strong>the</strong>se events - did not occur until after Ie Roy wired "api api" to Forbes W els. Most likely,<br />

<strong>the</strong> telegram was meant to place <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s on higher aleli: <strong>the</strong> situation in <strong>the</strong> Balkans<br />

was more dangerous than many initially assumed. Apparent confirmation is provided by <strong>the</strong><br />

12 Velzen, "Toelichting op telegram 'Api Api"'; Snijders "Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 16" (both in<br />

SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3); Tuyll, "Inside Knowledge" no page numbers, f11 17.<br />

13 See: Appendix 4, pp. 453 - 454.<br />

14 Tuyll, "Inside Knowledge"; Tuyll, The Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> World War I pp. 65, 67, 69.

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