Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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did not keep to the arrangement - because prices in Germany were much higher and
because shipping goods to Britain was precarious - Britain threatened to blockade the
Netherlands completely. 50 Unless the Dutch consented to an even more demanding
contract, it would stop recognising NOT's import guarantees. The Dutch signed the second
Agricultural Agreement in November 1916. 51 A month later, they entered into a similar
settlement with Germany, which received first right to any quotas not taken by Britain, and
agreed not to sink Dutch ships taking food products across the Channe1. 52 Germany
conceded the Dutch-Allied demands because it needed all the food it could obtain. 53 The
agreements caused the first major decline in Dutch exports to Gennany, despite continued
Gennan pressure to maintain the same levels of food supplies throughout 1917 and 1918. 54
The two European powers now regulated and dominated the entire Dutch export
market. Exporters of agricultural produce could no longer detennine with whom they
traded, but had their goods arbitrarily divided to meet the quota requirements of Great
Britain and Gennany. In its supervisory role, the NUM did not work entirely effectively. It
not only had to meet each of the quota limits but also to keep an eye on dwindling local
supplies. Cabinet ministers were entirely reluctant to involve themselves in the NUM, and
left much of the administration to industry representatives, with the result that the company
emphasised external trade above domestic consumption. 55 Major disagreements ensued
between the pro-Allied Minister of Finance, M. W. F. Treub, who was responsible for
exports, and the Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, F. E. Posthuma, who was in
charge of domestic consumption and tended to suppOli Gennany.56 They could not agree on
appropriate levels of external trade; they differed with each other on where to send
foodstuffs; nor did they see eye-to-eye on appropriate levels of surpluses. These quarrels
increased NUM' s inefficiency and adversely affected the viability of agricultural trade. 57
50 Bell, A history of The Blockade pp. 476 - 477.
51 Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" p. 141; Bell, A histolJ' of The Blockade pp. 477 - 478.
52 Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" p. 143.
53 Jbid. p. 191.
54 Frey, "Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands" p. 550.
55 Smidt, "De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer" p. 68.
56 Moore, Economic Aspects pp. 14 - 15; Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" p. 213.
57 Smidt, "De Regulering van de Nederlandse Uitvoer" p. 56, Smidt, "De regulering van de Nederlandse export van
landbouwprodukten" p. 125.