Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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High Command considered cutting the ration even further. 151 By this stage, they had also
stopped regularly receiving tea and coffee, except for an almost undrinkable coffee
substitute. 152 Although the quality and quantity of foodstuffs was better than for most
ordinary citizens, there is no doubt that the cuts in their food allocations contributed to the
widespread lack of discipline and decreased morale among troops through 1918, helping
fuel discontent in the Army. An especially critical soldier described his fellow troops in
July of 1918 as a group of "undeifed, worn-out men".153
High Command did its utmost to find alternatives for essential foods,
experimenting with yeast-free bread, coffee and tea substitutes. 154 Keeping soldiers, their
uniforms and dishes clean became a serious hygienic concern, when trials to replace soap
with an alleged washing powder proved unsuccessful. 155 However, the greatest concern for
High Command was that shortages would hamper military readiness. Already in March
1917, it had to postpone and cancel some training exercises due to a lack of petrol, fodder
and coa1. 156 One of the most alarming impacts of the severe coal and oil shortages affected
the Navy. During 1917, warships patrolled the seas less frequently and for shorter distances
at a time, directly compromising both Netherlands' neutrality and security. 157 Emergency
stockpiles, especially coal and food, had to be created and maintained in case the country
was invaded, but, of course, this was much easier said than done. Snijders did put in place
procedures so that if the Netherlands entered the war, it could quickly receive additional
supplies of fuels (especially coal) from potential allies. 158
Food shortages through 1917 and 1918 damaged public confidence in the
government and provided impetus for riots and violent disturbances in many of the larger
151 Commander Division IV to Commander of the Field Army, 28 September 1918, in ARA, "Archief van het
HoofdkwartierVeldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367.
152 Commander-in-Chiefto all military authorities, 7 February 1918, in ARA, "Archiefvan het Hoofdkwartier
Veldleger" entry no. 2.l3.16, inventory no. 367; Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde l71ilitairen in Tilbllrg p. 77.
153 "[O]ndenJoede, lIitgeplItte mannen" (italics in original) (July 1918, Jong, Notities van een Landstormman p. 212).
154 Inspector of Supply to Head of Supply (Hoofdintendant), 22 July 1916, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier
Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 305; Inspector of Supply to Commander of the Field Army, 23 April
1918, in ARA, "Archiefvan het Hoofdkwartier Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 367; Bosboom, In
Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 167.
155 Commander of the Field Army to Commander Division III, 2 June 1917, in ARA, "Archiefvan het Hoofdkwartier
Veldleger" entry no. 2.l3.16, inventOlY no. 251.
156 Inspector of Supply to Commander of the Field Army, l3 March 1917, in ARA, "Archief van het Hoofdkwartier
Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 351; Voorst tot Voorst, "Onze cavalerie" p. 442.
157 Nagelhout, "De to elating en internering" p. 29.
158 Commander-in-Chief, "Leiddraad" October 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70,
inventory no. 705.