Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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confidence in the Commander-in-Chieffor his successor, Alting von Geusau, in which he
not only revisited the April affair but also highlighted other areas of concem. 71 While
Alting von Geusau was more judicious in his opinions of Snijders, he was not exactly
supportive of him either. The cOlTespondence in September and early October strained the
relationship between High Command and the new government further. When Snijders
found out about and then read de Jonge's allegations, he was enraged. He approached
Alting von Geusau on the matter early in October 1918, expressing contempt at the devious
manner in which de Jonge handled the matter. 72 He also emphasised that the fonner
Minister of War never discussed any of his accusations with him personally, and that many
were based on untruths. He systematically addressed each allegation, offered his opinion,
and hoped that Alting von Geusau and the rest of the cabinet would make their own minds
up about the affair.
The high level of indignation Snijder expressed after the appointment of de Jonge
as head of the commission of enquiry into the Harskamp mutiny is, therefore, not
surprising. 73 For Snijders, it was another incident of unwelcome interference by Ruys de
Beerenbrouck's govennnent. Earlier conflicts arose when Alting von Geusau suggested
overhauling the Commander-in-Chiefs instructions of office. The problems between
Snijders and the crown could be solved more easily, so the minister argued, if the
Commander-in-Chiefwas responsible only to him and the Minister in Charge of the Navy.
Snijders did not agree, citing similar reasons as in 1914, including that his responsibility
was to the entire state and not to one civilian minister, that his position would in fact
become superfluous, and that the Minister of War would become the de filcto Commander­
in-Chiet,14 Perhaps, this was exactly what the govennnent wanted, namely to remove the
71 "Nota, door den Minister van Oorlog Jhr de Jonge achtergelaten bij zijn aftreden" 11 July 1918, in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3.
72 See: "Beschouwingen van den Minister van OOl'log Jhr Alting van Geusau aan den Opperbevelhebber van Land- en
Zeemacht ter hand gesteld op 26 September 1918"; Commander-in-Chief, "Nota ter beantwoording van de Nota dd.
11 Juli 1918, door den toenmaligen Minister van Oorlog Jhr. de Jonge gericht aan den Raad van Ministers" [Note in
response to the note of 11 July 1918 by the then Minister of War Jhr de Jonge to the cabinet] 3 October 1918, both in
SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3. Snijders thought de Jonge had addressed his note to the cabinet; in fact, it was
addressed only to the new Minister of War (Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 21 October 1918, in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3).
73 See: above.
74 Commander-in-Chiefreply to "Bespreking met den Opperbevelhebber", 26 September 1918, in ARA, "Archieven
van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.