Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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German equivalents on the other side of the border. 44 Snijders graciously accepted the guns,
although he refused any cross-frontier collaboration if it meant his men could not shoot at
German aircraft flying above the Netherlands. British officials also believed that it was
desirable to supply the Netherlands with anti-aircraft guns, in an effort to encourage the
Dutch to shoot down German Zeppelins en route for Britain. In February 1917, they
considered sending a shipment of six guns. 45 Like the Gennan offer a year later, the guns
were vital for their given role (preventing belligerent aircraft crossing the Netherlands to
bomb enemy territory), since the Dutch Anny was desperately short of anti-aircraft
weaponry and ammunition.
Britain's interest in strengthening the Netherlands' armed forces became more of a
concern in 1918. The Northern Neutrals' Committee, a high-level committee responsible
for dealing with the Scandinavian neutrals and the Netherlands, seriously considered a
request from the Netherlands in late December 1917, for artillery, ammunition, gas shells,
machine-guns, box respirators, searchlights and hand-grenades. 46 These supplies fonned
part of Scheme "S", a British plan to send reinforcements to the Netherlands in case
Gennany invaded the Schelde area. In January 1918, the Committee authorised the creation
of a brigade stationed pennanently in Britain until it was needed for the implementation of
Scheme "S".47 The following May, British military attaches arrived in The Hague for a
secret meeting with Dutch military representatives. 48 This was not a diplomatic meeting but
a military one, and it is possible that except for High Command and the Minister of War,
the rest of the government was unaware that it occurred. 49 Cabinet ministers would not
allow any official negotiations with belligerents for fear of jeopardising neutrality. In fact,
Snijders and the cabinet had rejected calls for similar meetings with German military
44 Snijders, "Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914 - 1918 no. 16" in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A!3; Tuyll, The
Netherlands and World War I pp. 190 - 19l.
45 (Decyphered) Telegram from Dutch Minister in London to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 February 1917 in
FO 37112973 1917 (war).
46 Sanders, "The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning" pp. 213 - 219.
47 Watson, "Britain's Dutch Policy" p. 212; Porter, "Dutch Neutrality".
48 The meeting and its consequences were ably described by Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" pp. 229 - 231. See also:
Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 195.
49 Sanders, "The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning" p. 264. C. Smit surmises that the rest of the cabinet must
have been informed about these meetings (Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Derde deel p. 23).