Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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it was hard enough keeping Dutch aeroplanes within territorial airspace, let alone alerting
others of infringements. I IS
The Dutch did not have enough anti-aircraft guns or measuring equipment to gauge
the distance of contravening planes and shoot them down. I 16 The few that were shot down,
Dutch soldiers interned along with the crew, otherwise, they noted the aircraft's nationality
and the government protested against the neutrality violation at the respective embassy. I 17
Despite lessons in aircraft detection, it remained difficult for border guards to distinguish
the nationality of aeroplanes. For example, in July 1918, Snijders reported that during the
previous month his troop sighted 52 breaches of Dutch territorial airspace. Of these, three
were by Allied planes, five aircraft were German, and the nationality of the other 44 was
unknown, although they were most probably British. liS This made credible complaints
against the belligerents problematic and the maintenance of neutrality in the air all but
impossible. Occasionally, Britain and Germany protested that the Dutch were acting
unneutrally because they were unnable to shoot down more of the contravening planes and
airships. 1 19 As mentioned earlier, this led both belligerents to offer anti-aircraft guns to the
Netherlands.
NEUTRALITY VIOLATIONS WITH DEADLY CONSEQUENCES
Despite their neutrality, the Dutch were not spared the experience of warfare. Not
only did fishennen drown at sea after their ships hit mines or were sunle by torpedoes, but
some of the aeroplanes that crossed into Dutch airspace dropped bombs on the Netherlands,
causing damage, injuring and occasionally killing citizens. 12o Stray mines stranded on
Dutch beaches also caused damage and loss of life. The military played a central role in
limiting the damage caused by wayward missiles.
The first bomb attack on the Netherlands occurred early in the war. On 22
September 1914, a British plane crossed the city of Maastricht in Limburg and dropped two
115 Commander of Division IV to Brigade-Commander, 8 September 1915, in ARA, "Archiefvan het Hoofdkwartier
Veldleger" entry no. 2.13.16, inventory no. 168.
116 Nagelhout, "De to elating en internering" p. 37.
117 See: Chapters 2, pp. 42 - 45, and Chapter 5, pp. 185 - 187 regarding the internment of aeroplanes during the war.
118 Commander-in-Chiefto the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War and Minister in Charge of the Navy, 12
July 1918, ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5.
119 Baer, "The Anglo-German antagonism" p. 279.
120 See: Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 2, pp. 214 - 222, for an overview of the bomb attacks.