Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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30 per cent (at least) of others enjoying extraordinary leave, the 61 per cent absentee rate,
quoted by Snijders in October of that year, was not exaggerated. When extraordinary leave
was mismanaged, as it inevitably was, the figure could escalate further. Of the 200,000 odd
soldiers supposedly mobilised, it left around 80,000 to fulfil the many neutrality and
defence roles described in previous chapters. Little wonder, Snijders worried that his anned
forces were going to waste.
THE EASTER SCARE, 1916
Once begun in 1915, parliament continuously urged the government to grant more
indefinite and extraordinary leave. Subsequently, cabinet ministers placed pressure on High
Command to give in to these demands, although agreeing with Snijders that the country was
still in enough danger to restrict leave provisions within the bounds of defence
requirements. One reason why High Command did look favourably on granting leave was
because it improved troop morale. Maintaining high morale becomes especially imperative
when an anny is mobilised for long periods at a time with little variation in daily routine.
Throughout 1915, several small military riots broke out in the larger cities, fuelled by a mix
of boredom and dissatisfaction at the lack of leave; large concentrations of soldiers in one
place helped generate discontent. 79
At this stage, Snijders convinced Bosboom that the arnled forces should remain
fully mobilised. But this became far more difficult to do as the war on the Western Front
sank further into stalemate. By late 1915, Bosboom had considerable problems persuading
parliament that a full mobilisation was an absolute necessity. In the eyes of many
parliamentarians the risk of invasion had decreased significantly.80 The danger seemed to
dwindle even further when the first major offensive of the new year - around Verdun in
February 1916 - did not create a major breakthrough for the Gennans, instead degenerating
into a protracted period of slaughter in and around the French salient that neither side could
bring to a decisive end. lfthe Netherlands was seemingly not under threat, so many Dutch
commentators argued, why should parliament accept a full mobilisation that was both
expensive and unpopular?
79 See: Chapter 12, pp. 401 - 410, for more information about military riots.
80 Minister of War to Commander-in-Chief, 14 October 1915, in ARA, "Collectie Bosboom" [Collection Bosboom]
entry no. 2.21.027, inventory no. 6.