Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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July 1916, much to the disgust ofSnijders, who feared a further diminution of the Army's
fighting quality. 52
The demand that younger men served before older men remained so intense that in
May 1917 Bosboom resigned after a debdcle in parliament concerning the conscription of
the 1908 land storm intake (those born in 1888) ahead of the 1918landstorm and military
intakes, who were ten years younger (born in 1898). The Second Chamber narrowly
accepted a motion brought by one of the SDAP's more vocal representatives, M. P.
Marchant, requiring the 1918 intakes to be conscripted first. 53 Bosboom declared he would
go ahead with his original plans regardless, resulting in another parliamentary vote against
the Minister. Twice defeated, Bosboom felt he had no option but to resign. However, the
call-up of the landstorm was already too well advanced to change, so Bosboom's temporary
replacement, J. J. Rambonnet (who also held the portfolio of Minister in Charge of the
Navy), presented afait acompli to parliament in May 1917, and managed to get the earlier
land storm intake legislated.
For High Command, the land storm amendments of 1915 were equally
problematic. Snijders had warned Bosboom from the beginning that replacing well-trained
men with inadequately-trained landstormers weakened the Army. Not only did it decrease
its fighting quality, and place undue strain on a young and inexperienced officer corps, it
also made a second mobilisation, in case of invasion, an absolute necessity. Snijders wished
to avoid a large-scale remobilisation at all costs, because the chances of it going awry were
too great. 54 He had no choice, however, when the government forced his hand by sending
thousands of mobilised soldiers on leave. It created the rather absurd situation where the
country's reserve force (made up of soldiers on leave) was far more capable of withstanding
an invasion than those actually manning the borders and serving in the fortifications. 55 It
would take years to bring the land storm up to the same standard. Snijders did not presume
that the country had these years to spare.
52 Staatsblad. no. 361, 29 July 1916; Commander-in-Chiefto Minister of War, 30 September 1916, in ARA,
"Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411.
53 Colenbrander, Studien en Aantekeningen pp. 254 - 255; Beaufort, Vijftig Jaren p. 270; Bosboom, In Moeilijke
Omstandigheden p. 78; Kleijngeld, Gemobiliseerde militairen in Tilburg p. 22.
54 See: section "Second Mobilisation" pp. 362 - 364.
55 Commander-in-Chiefto Minister of War, 25 June 1915, pp. 9 -10, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf'
entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 293.