Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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cartridges; however, only 80 - 85 million cartridges were stockpiled. ll3 Stocks of rifle
ammunition and artillery munitions were so low that shooting exercises were limited. I 14
Each artillery battery had 700 rounds available per gun, well below the minimum 1,000
specified by planners. I 15 Other equipment in high demand and short supply included
spades, telegraph wire, and bridge-building materials. I 16 Again, the military had
underestimated the needs of an operational Anny. Unlike clothing manufacturing, however,
the Netherlands could not tum to ready alternatives having neither a large arms industry nor
the raw materials stockpiled to produce replacement munitions. 117
Part of the supply problem was administrative. According to one landweer
commander, munitions for his company were delayed not because they were unavailable,
but because the location of the warehouse was unknown. I IS Others reported on packing
problems in warehouses, staff shortages, and even ineffective labelling and issuing of
receipts. I 19 A contributing factor to the mayhem was that Army restructuring begun in 1913
had not yet been fully implemented and many warehouses had not received the revised
regimental structures. 120 The administrative problem, however, was not only one of supply
for it affected even the simple yet fundamentally important task of registering which men
had turned up and which had not. One especially pessimistic report noted that among
cavalry regiments:
Whole detachments reported to the depots without the necessary administrative
documentation, even without a name list; surplus goods alTived, with a few
exceptions, without inventory or without labels on the boxes; the
113 Bosboom, III Moeilijke Ol71stalldighedell p. 33.
114 Inspector ofInfantry, Major-General Beijze, to all commanders of infantry regiments, 7 August 1914, ARA,
"Archieven van Divisies, Regimenten en andere eenheden van de Infanterie van Koninklijke Landmacht, 1814-
1940" [Archives of the Divisions, Regiments and other infantry units of the Royal Netherlands' Army, 1814 - 1940]
entry no. 2,13.52, inventory no. 515.
115 Staatscommissie, Waarnel71illgen bij de Gemobiliseerde Lalldmacht p. 39; Bosboom, In Moeilijke
Omstandighedell p. 34.
116 Staatscommissie, Waarnemingen bij de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht p. 31; Bosboom, In Moeilijke
Omstandigheden, p. 34;
117 For more information on the Dutch armaments industry during the war, see: Chapter 9, pp. 299 - 310.
118 Mobilisation questionnaire filled in by Commander 4 Compo 1 Batt. 3 RLWI, no date [March 1915] in ARA,
"Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 42.
119 "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13, no page numbers, section "Bijzondere opmerkingen. 6. Bereden Artillerie", section "G.
Ret op voet van oOl'log brengen van het veldleger"; Colonel in charge of supplies (Kolonel-Intendance) for the
Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 16 November 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale
Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 48.
120 "Schets voor het, door het Depatiement van Om'log openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13, no page numbers, section "Ret op voet van oorIog brengen van de bezettingstroepen".