Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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and often confusing. To ease some of the confusion, the Ministry of War set up a special
telephone number to give callers advice about the law's technicalities. 76 Commanders often
consulted lawyers or troops with legal training. 77 In most communities, in fact, the mayor
and municipal councils continued to govern as they had in peacetime with minimal
involvement by the local commander. Even in the "state of siege", the daily functioning of
municipalities was barely affected by military command. 78 In Utrecht, which existed in a
"state of war", the municipal council established a "legal committee" (rechtskundige
camite) as an intermediary between itself and the Commander of the New Holland
Waterline so they could fulfil the legal requirement of consultation. 79 The Provincial
Governors also functioned as important points of contact between the armed forces and
local authorities. 80
Conflict between the military and municipal bodies was inevitable, however, as
were misinterpretations of the law. 8l In his memoirs, de Jonge described how "military
authority was not always exercised with tact and modesty".82 This was not surprising given
that commanders had no training in local administration. Since the "state of siege" officially
gave commanders enonnous powers, many believed that civilian authorities should do as
they told them to, showing little understanding of the subtleties of local politics.
In an attempt to alleviate some misgivings, Bosboom released a directive in March
1915, explaining how Articles 10 and 22 of the War Law should be interpreted, namely that
all public ordinances had to be declared by the military authorities, even if the ordinance
originated from within the municipality.83 Nevertheless, commanders could not impose any
regulations themselves if there was no clear military need to do so. In other words,
76 S. L. van der Wal (ed.), Herinnerillgen van Jllr. MI'. B. C. de Jonge met brieven !lit zijn nalatenschap. [Memories
of Jh1'. Mr. B. C. de Jonge with letters from his estate] Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1968, p. 21.
77 Bosboom, 111 Moeilijke Omstal1digheden pp. 306 - 307.
78 Hasselton, "De wisseling van het opperbevel" p. 55.
79 D. T. Koen, Utrecht Verdedigd. Fort(ficatie ell mobilisatie 1914 - 1940. [Utrecht defended. Fortification and
mobilisation 1914 - 1940] Utrecht: Matrij s, 1990, p. 47.
80 Bos-Rops, "De Commissaris en de vluchtelingen" p. 102.
81 Unfortunately outside the scope of this study, the manner in which the military exercised authority in individual
municipalities demands further research.
82 "[H]et militair gezag werd niet altijd met tact en bescheidenheid uitgeoefend" (Minister of War, B. C. de Jonge, in
Wal (ed.), Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge p. 21).
83 Minister of War, "Toepassing van de artikelen 10 en 22 der Wet van den 23sten Mei 1899 (Staatsblad no. 128),
houdende bepalingen tel' uitvoering van artikel187 der Grondwet" [Application of Articles 10 and 22 of the law of
23 May 1899 (Staatsblad. no. 128), including regulations for the exercise of Article 187 of the Constitution] Militair
Rechtelijk Tijdschrift. 10, 1915, p.427. See also: Clarenbeek, "De Oorlogswet voor Nederland" Chapter 3.