Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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course, inundation did make any infantry advance towards the Waterline extremely
difficult,123 and to a degree this offset some of its more marked deficiencies.
Comparatively, the fortifications around Amsterdam were in much healthier shape,
consisting of smaller, yet stronger, fortified positions with better quality close and long­
range artillery than those of the Waterline. 124 But even the effectiveness of the Amsterdam
fortifications was diminished by improvements made to the range and firepower of mobile
artillery before the war.
While strategists hoped that Fortress Holland (and especially Amsterdam) would
hold out against a concerted attack for several months,125 the relative ease with which
German heavy artillery sacked similar fortifications in Belgium, at Liege in August and
Antwerp in October 1914, demonstrated that this was highly unlikely. With these Belgian
defeats in mind, Snijders would, in October 1918, describe the Netherlands' fortifications
of 1914 as "indefensible" .126 The declining strength of fOliifications and artillery would
become an ongoing issue for High Command throughout the war and reinforced the
importance of the Field Army's tasks in front of the fortifications, one reason why garrison
troops and certain artillery pieces were moved out of the fortifications into Field Army units
or to the borders. 127
The nature of Dutch defence, based on a fortified centre supplemented by a
concentrated mobile force, left much of the country without a ready military presence. The
nOlih and north-east of the Netherlands were especially vulnerable to attack. However,
these areas were not bereft of soldiers. Locallandweer (and later landstorm) troops were
stationed there, although fewer in number than elsewhere (see Map 5 above and Table 4
below). They were responsible for protecting important strategic positions such as railway
stations and bridges. More importantly, along the borders and coastlines they monitored
who and what crossed into and out of the countly. Specialist troops also mobilised into
123 Thanks to Rans Andriessen, Syd Wise and Marco Roveling for helping ascertain the relative strength of Dutch
fortifications and inundations in 1914 and 1918, "Artillery Question" posts on the World War One discussion list
, 15 - 16 November 2000.
124 Geusau, Onze Weennacht pp. 32 - 34.
125 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I p. 105.
126 "Op het oogenblik der mobilisatie van 1 augustus 1914 verkeerde onze linien en stellingen in een toestand van
volslagen onverdedigbaarheid" (Commander-in-Chief, "Nota ter beantwoording van de Nota dd. 11 July 1918, door
den toenmaligen Minister van Oorlog JHR. DE JONGE gericht aan den Raad van Ministers" [Note in answer to the
Note dated 11 July 1918, by the former Minister of War Jhr de Jonge addressed to the cabinet] 3 October 1918, p. 9,
in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 5).
127 See: Chapter 9, p. 301.