Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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for years. 134 Yet very little was done to ease the problem, because govemments did not
wish to conscript soldiers into higher ranks and because the financial costs involved were
substantial. 135 At any rate, there were few short-tenn solutions available and during the war
the shortage would be accentuated rather than alleviated.
Greater transport and supply problems were encountered by troops in the
fortifications, especially in Amsterdam, than by those in the Field Anny. Garrison soldiers
had no trains available for transport to and from their positions. They had to requisition
carts, vehicles and automobiles from 10cals. 136 Few depots were allocated to them either
and many were dispatched immediately into fortifications. This caused some serious
problems, as most fortified positions did not have the space available to store food,
bedding, weapons or equipment. 137 In an update on 3 August, Buhlman notified Snijders
that administrative staff were missing from the Field Anny's Headquarters, that there were
not enough weapons for his landweer troops, and that some regiments had no field
kitchens. 13s
Nevertheless, the military succeeded in its primary goal: a speedy mobilisation. By
3 August, a force of 196,657 men (including around 9,000 naval conscripts)139 had been
mobilised and these men were, despite some problems, deployable. 140 It was not a
134 Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigd pp. 339 - 342.
135 Isselt, "De wijziging van de landweerwet" pp. 202 - 203, 215 - 218; Klinkert, Het Vaderland Verdedigdp. 339.
136 "Schets voor het, door het Departement van OOt'log openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "Het op voet van oorlog brengen van de bezettingstroepen".
137 Kolonel-Intendance for the Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in-Chief, 16 November 1914, in
ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 48.
138 Commander Field Army to Commander-in-Chief, 3 August 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf'
entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. l.
139 Hengel, "De mobilisatie van de zeemacht" p. 31.
140 This figure is from a note by the Head of Department II of the Ministry of War to the Administrator, Head of
Department VII of the Ministry of War, 30 May 1916 (in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3) in response to
wrongfully quoted absentee figures in "Schets voor het, door het Departement van OOt'log openbaar te maken
Mobilisatie-rapport" (in SMG/DC, "Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3). This is the earliest non-published source I have
found stemming directly from Ministry of War officials that quote a mobilisation number. The numbers cited remain
problematic as counts were taken by various regiments at varying times and, as has already been noted, accuracy in
some depots was lacking (Commander ofField Army to Commander-in-Chief, 30 August 1914, in ARA, "Archieven
van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 128). It is possible that the number mobilised during the first
weeks of August came closer to the 203,657 mark as mentioned by the Minister of War, Nicolaas Bosboom ("Nota
omtrent hetgeen sedert den aanvang del' mobilisatie van het leger is gedaan om de gevechtswaarde en de uitrusting
hiervan te verhoogen" [Note regarding what has been done since the start of the mobilisation to increase the fighting
strength and equipment ofthe Army] 16 January 1918, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70,
inventory no. 705) although in his 1933 memoirs, Bosboom believed the number to have been much lower (180,000)
(Bosboom, In Moeili}ke Omstandigheden p. 30). The 203,657 figure was also published in the Staatscommissie,
Waarnemingen bi} de Gemobiliseerde Landmacht (p. 85). This later figure was quoted by F. Snapper ("Enige
Sterktecijfers Betreffende de Nederlandse Landmacht in de Periode 1840 - 1940" [Some strength-figures for the