Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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Allied demands with much greater ease than the govemment could have done.
Nevertheless, because the NOT was accountable for all impOlis, the government was
effectively bound by their agreements. 35 No wonder Gennany felt irritated by the NOT's
actions.
Nevetiheless, Gennany recognised that because of the NOT, the Netherlands could
import foodstuffs from abroad, which would free local produce for export. 36 At least until
the United States entered the war in April 1917, Dutch exports to Getmany were far greater
than they had been before the war. 37 The NOT had no control over outgoing trade (except
to ensure that imported goods were not re-exported) and the Dutch sold vast amounts of
locally-produced goods and pre-war stocks to its eastem neighbour. Prices in Gennany
were so high that exporting and smuggling were immensely profitable. In fact, economic
historians have argued that the Dutch economy thrived in 1915 and 1916 because of the
unending demand for produce and goods in Gennany.38 Until the summer of 1916, the
Netherlands was the most important foreign supplier of foodstuffs to Gennany. Dutch
exports of cheese, butter, eggs, potatoes and meat tripled between 1913 and 1915. 39 The
NOT also gave the same guarantees of domestic consumption for goods impOlied from
Germany or Austria-Hungary as it did for Allied goods. Therefore, the Central Powers also
gained from maintaining a good relationship with the NOT, as it stopped their goods being
sold on to their enemies. Still, Britain and France were able to place considerably more
pressure on Dutch importers and enforce a much stricter blockade of Gennany than
Germany was able to do in retum.
Widespread smuggling could undennine the credibility of NOT guarantees. Britain
was exceedingly concemed about the amount of smuggling taking place and broached the
subject with Trust directors and the Dutch govemment on a number of occasions. 4o The
directors also asked the govemment for help in ensuring that consigned goods stayed in the
35 Smidt, "De Regulering van de N ederlandse Uitvoer" p. 17.
36 Ibid. pp. 19 - 20.
37 Frey, Der Erste Weltkrieg lind die Niederlande p. 153.
38 Jan L. van Zanden, The Economic History of the Netherlands 1914 -1995. A small open economy in the 'long'
twentieth centllly. London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 93 - 94.
39 Frey, "Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands" p. 547.
40 British Minister in The Hague to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 1915, and to Representative ofthe
Netherlands' Overseas Trust, J. van Vollenhoven, 4 October 1915, both in Smit (ed.), Bescheiden betrejJende de
bllitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 - 1919. Vierde Dee11914 - 1917 pp. 429 -
430,457 - 458. See also: the piles of correspondence on smuggling between the British legation in The Hague and
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in ARA, "Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 'A' dossiers" [Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 'A' files. A 250. European War 1914 -1918] entry no. 2.05.04, inventory no. 689, 702, 710, 712, 717, 737.