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Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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- ZZ7-<br />

ships in Antwerp that GenTIany had requisitioned in October 1914. As well, Gennany<br />

expected <strong>the</strong> Dutch to increase <strong>the</strong>ir agricultural <strong>and</strong> cattle exports <strong>and</strong> ease credit<br />

arrangements between <strong>the</strong> two countlies. 173 It seemed most probable to <strong>the</strong> Dutch (<strong>and</strong><br />

Allies) that Gennany was on <strong>the</strong> verge <strong>of</strong> declaring war on <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s, if <strong>the</strong>y did not<br />

agree to <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

Long discussions between Dutch, Allied <strong>and</strong> GenTIan diplomats ensued. The<br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s was willing to accept many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s, as long as GenTIany did not<br />

declare war <strong>and</strong> as long as <strong>the</strong> Allies promised not to retaliate. A major issue <strong>of</strong> contention<br />

remained <strong>the</strong> transit <strong>of</strong> s<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> gravel. On 19 Aplil 1918, Gennany reduced its claims: no<br />

weaponry would be moved through <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s, but shoes, clo<strong>the</strong>s <strong>and</strong> food for <strong>the</strong><br />

GenTIan anTIies in Belgium should not be stopped. Mercantile transit trade should be<br />

unlimited (as long as goods were accompanied by guarantees <strong>of</strong> civilian consumption). In<br />

addition, <strong>and</strong> this was most contentious, GenTIany wanted 200,000 tonnes <strong>of</strong> glit <strong>and</strong> s<strong>and</strong><br />

transported without an accompanying guarantee <strong>of</strong> civilian use. 174 Although some progress<br />

was made by late April, no concrete reconciliation on <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> s<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> glit had been<br />

reached. The Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s was also unwilling to allow <strong>the</strong> 36 Gennan ships in Antwerp out<br />

via <strong>the</strong> Schelde, no doubt because <strong>the</strong> Schelde was so important to <strong>the</strong> designs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

Central <strong>and</strong> Allied Powers. 175<br />

Ultimately, Germany did not wish to go to war with <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s, although it is<br />

almost certain that if <strong>the</strong> Dutch had not compromised, it would have done so. General<br />

Ludendorff, especially, had little compunction about threatening <strong>the</strong> neutral with war. 176<br />

The Dutch authorities took <strong>the</strong> possible threat very seliously. On 26 Aplil, one military<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>er even suggested to Loudon that <strong>the</strong> Anny should prepare to blow railway<br />

blidges in case <strong>the</strong> GenTIans tried to force its trains through. 177 Snijders was somewhat<br />

more circumspect about <strong>the</strong> military threat Gennany posed at that particular time. The<br />

GenTIans had recently launched a massive <strong>of</strong>fensive on <strong>the</strong> Western Front, absorbing all<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir military resources. As he explained to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r military comm<strong>and</strong>ers on 23 April,<br />

<strong>the</strong>re had been no evidence that GenTIany was building up any forces on <strong>the</strong> eastern or<br />

173 Ibid. p. 78.<br />

174 S<strong>and</strong>ers, "The Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s in British Strategic Planning" p. 168.<br />

175 Ibid. p. 169.<br />

176 Tuyll, The Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> World War 1 pp. 211 - 212.<br />

177 Comm<strong>and</strong>er Hoek van Holl<strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, 26 April 1918, in ARA, "Kabinetsarchief e. a.<br />

van het Ministerie van Buitenl<strong>and</strong>se Zaken1871 - 1940" entry no. 2.05.18, inventory no. 239.

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