Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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outweighed any strategic advantages of capturing Dutch territory. In this respect, the
advantage of keeping the Dutch neutral was of greater significance for Gennany than Dutch
deterrence measures. Similarly, it is also important to note that once the economic benefit
provided by Dutch neutrality declined (in the course of 1917 and 1918), Germany had fewer
qualms about pressuring the Netherlands and threatening it with military intervention. 41
Nevertheless, both Gennany and Great Britain upheld the perceived value of Dutch
deterrence measures, at least as long as it helped to discourage its respective enemy from
invading or capturing the Netherlands. By 1917, in fact, the ability of the Dutch anned
forces to withstand an attack from either side had decreased significantly. They could not
keep up with the technological advances made by the warring annies, nor did they have the
raw materials to manufacture new equipment. The military was becoming increasingly
obsolescent by the month. As a consequence, it would have been easier for Britain or
Gennany to invade the Netherlands in 1917 than it was in 1914, even though the 1914
mobilisation was far from perfect and in 1917 twice as many Dutch troops could be
deployed. 42
Both warring sides were well aware of the declining effectiveness of Dutch
defences. Although, as Hubert van Tuyll rightly pointed out, the size of the Anny increased
from 200,000 to over 400,000 troops by 1918, giving an impression of strength,43 neither
Great Britain nor Gennany were under any illusions about the capability of Dutch
equipment, ammunition, or weaponry to withstand a concerted onslaught. That the Allied
and Central Powers both supplied military equipment to the Netherlands during 1917 and
1918, which they had been loathe to do in previous war years, illustrates that they hoped to
increase the chances of the country resisting an attack by their enemy.
On occasion, these supplies had more immediate justifications. For example,
Germany offered the Netherlands a few anti-aircraft guns in the middle of 1918, after first
having expressed their disgust at the lack of action taken against British transgressions of
Dutch airspace. At one stage during the discussions, German diplomats suggested that
Dutch border troops co-ordinate attempts to shoot down the Allied planes with their
41 For further information on the relationship between Germany and the Netherlands in 1917 and 1918, see: Chapter
6, pp. 224 - 229, and Chapter 11, pp. 367 - 368.
42 This argument is also supported by Snapper, "De gevechtswaarde".
43 Tuyll, The Netherlands and World War I pp. 344 - 347.