Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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To ensure the cherished peace and its survival, the small state has no other
option but to make concessions. It cannot afford to, indeed must not overstep
the mark. The highest principle of its foreign policy must be to avoid, to defuse,
and to get rid of conflicts in as generous a manner as possible. 4
The neutral's ultimate purpose was staying out of the war. In the end, the loss of
sovereignty, independence and economic security - three things that the Dutch had hoped to
achieve by staying neutral - were the price to pay for fulfilment of the aim.
In enforcing compliance with international law and the agreements reached
between the Netherlands and warring states, neutrality could be made or broken. Without
credible means of ensuring they kept their promises, Dutch neutrality was worthless. In this
respect, the armed forces played an essential role, acting as the "police force" that protected
neutrality and prevented violations occurring from within and outside the kingdom. By
patrolling territorial waters and borders, administering decrees in the "state of war" and
"siege", checking cargo leaving and entering the country, inteming foreigners and their war
materials, and shooting at foreign aeroplanes, the military helped to maintain the credibility
of neutrality.
Undoubtedly, the General Staff underestimated the time-consuming and resource­
draining nature of maintaining neutrality as well as the sudden escalation of military
involvement in all manner of neutrality concems. In fact, it was entirely overwhelmed by
the many neutrality tasks, so much so that within months of mobilising, the military's
capability to resist a possible invasion had diminished significantly. The manifold
requirements of neutrality, whether at the borders, at sea or in the "state of siege", took
priority over defence. To this end, between August 1914 and November 1918, the Field
Anny scattered, the fortifications emptied and the Navy dispersed. The objectives of
successful defence identified by the General Staffbefore 1914, namely concentration of
Field Army might and strongly fortified positions, were no longer feasible during the war, a
reflection of the fundamental contradiction that existed between trying to maintain an
armed force for defence purposes and meeting neutrality requirements at the same time.
Nevertheless, defence had to lose out to neutrality because if neutrality worked, then there
would be no need for such armed might. Without proper defence measures in place,
however, not only did the deterrence value of neutrality disappear, if neutrality failed, the
4 Werner Rings, 1997, as quoted in Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe p.16.