Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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[ identification] marks on the necks of many horses or on horseshoes were
'11 'bl 121
1 egl e
Another reason given for the chaos at depots was the lack of able officers among the
administrative ranks. 122 This was not an isolated problem. Officer shortages affected all
levels of the military and would remain one of the principal stumbling blocks to achieving a
well-trained and disciplined armed force. 123
Bedding, blankets and food were also in short supply. Many civilian bakeries and
butcheries did not fill contracts they had signed years earlier with the military, some
because they could not, others because higher prices could be had selling privately. Some
suppliers, who had claimed they could deliver 35,000 rations daily, only supplied 1,000 on
1 August. 124 To make matters worse, in several places, emergency rations were not
complete or did not arrive from warehouses in the first few days. 125 In an alleged incident in
Den Briel on 2 August, soldiers from a particularly hungry regiment looted a local bakery
for breakfast. 126 In order to rectify the food situation, a central supply depot for the Field
Army was established in Rotterdam, where food was either produced or stockpiled for
distribution to regiments in the south of the country. 127 Elsewhere, local bakeries,
fishmongers and butchers supplied food under revised contracts, or civilians were paid to
house and feed billeted soldiers. Luckily, the food problems were short-lived. As early as 3
August, enough resources were available to bake and butcher for the whole military. 128
121 "Geheele detachementen meldden [sic] zich bij de depots zonder de noodige administratie bescheiden, zelfs
zonder een naamlijst; overcomplete goederen kwamen, op enkele uitzonderingen na, zonder inventaris ofzonder
etiketten op de kisten aan; bij vele pam'den waren de merken op de halsvlakte of de hoefnummers onleesbaar."
("Schets voor het, door het Departement van OOl"log openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13, no page numbers, section "Bijzondere Opmerkingen. 5. Cavalerie").
122 Territorial Commander in Friesland to Commander-in-Chief, 31 October 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de
Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 50.
123 For more about the impact of officer shortages and lack of training during the war, see: Chapter 10. pp. 337 - 340,
349 - 358.
124 "Schets voor het, door het Departement van OOl"log openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A/3, no page numbers, section "G. Ret op voet van oorlog brengen van het veldleger".
125 Commander 6 Batt. LWI to Commander-in-Chief, 14 October 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf'
entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 50; Kolonel-illtendallce for the Fortified Position of Amsterdam to Commander-in­
Chief, 16 November 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 48; "Schets
voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13, no page numbers, section "G. Ret op voet van oorlog brengen van het veldleger".
126 Altes, De grote OOl"log vall de kleine man p. 38.
127 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 160.
128 "Schets voor het, door het Departement van Oorlog openbaar te maken Mobilisatie-rapport" in SMG/DC,
"Mobilisatieverslag" 91A13, p. 28.