Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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territorial advantage to an ally. Even combined, Belgium and the Netherlands were not large
enough to exeli significant influence in international affairs; they were, in the words of one
commentator, "too large for a napkin but too small for a tablecloth".32 This would remain a
major stumbling block to closer Dutch-Belgian relations after Belgium seceded from the
Netherlands in 1830. Once Belgium attained official independent status in 1839, its geo­
strategic importance (bordering both France and Germany and providing a territorial barrier
between Britain and France) was heightened. For almost entirely this reason alone,
Europe's major powers (Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia) imposed a
state of pennanent neutrality on Belgium, guaranteeing that they would come to its rescue if
it were attacked. 33 The Netherlands, on the other hand, did not have its neutrality
guaranteed, principally because it was not as pivotal to separating the west European
nations. Yet the conditions that forced neutrality on Belgium made it equally attractive as a
voluntary foreign policy for the Netherlands.
With the rise of Gennany/Prussia as a major power in Europe and the creation of
Bismarck's complicated system of alliances (1862 - 1890), the leanings of particular states
(however small) became increasingly important. Countries like the Netherlands had the
potential to upset the Bismarckian balance drastically and, as a result, small European states
gained significance far beyond their size. 34 By staying neutral, the Netherlands helped
maintain the status quo. To a certain degree, the Dutch were aware of their potential to
disturb the peace and believed that their neighbours would respect their neutrality for the
same reason. It helped reinforce the idea that neutrality was not only sacred to themselves
but to other Europeans as wel1. 35 This belief was borne out by the Franco-Prussian war,
when the French and Germans respected both the neutrality of the Netherlands as well as
that of Belgium.
In the dozen or so years leading up to the outbreak of the Great War, two
increasingly antagonistic camps replaced Bismarck's careful balance-of-power system.
Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary found themselves surrounded by a loose alliance of
32 Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy p. 245.
33 Rune Johansson, Small State in Boundary Conflict. Belgium and the Belgian-German Border 1914 - 1919. Lund:
Lund University Press, 1988, p. 40.
34 Paul W. Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System" The Intel'l1ational
History Review. 6, no. 1, February 1984, p. 3.
35 Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy pp. 4, 59; Smit, Nederland in de Eerste WereldoorlQg. Eerste deel p. 4.