Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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from paying others to do their service for them) and the introduction of new categories of
conscription. Once mobilised in August 1914, the Netherlands boasted about 200,000
troops at home, most serving in the Army, with 9,000 in the Navy, and a handful helping
the fledgling Air Branch fly its four aeroplanes. I I Another 33,000 mainly native Indonesian
soldiers served in the East Indies' Army, which was permanently posted in the colonies. 12
Unfortunately, the many positive steps taken to modernise, strengthen and develop the
military in the two decades before the outbreak of the Great War came so rapidly, that the
military administration was still catching up. This meant that soldiers mobilised in 1914
were SUbjected to different legislation, were at various stages of training, and were led by
officers of varying degrees of competence. As we shall see, alongside considerable material
shortages, it complicated the mobilisation of the anned forces and made the fulfilment of
their wartime responsibilities all the more difficult.
HAVING To Do ONE'S DUTY
According to the Constitution, all male citizens were responsible for defending
their country and overseas possessions. 13 As was common throughout Europe, this meant
that the government compelled men to serve in the military. In 1898, it finally introduced
personal conscription into law after 25 years of opposition to the original legislation, 14
bringing the country one step closer to attaining truly representative anned forces. Most of
the conscripts served in the Anny, because the nature of naval service suited volunteer
sailors better: they had to be available in peace and wartime, often in the colonies, and ships
required continuous skilled maintenance. 15
11 See: fn 140 in Chapter 3 for further details.
12 H. Carpentier Alting, W. de Cock Buning, "The Effect of the War upon the Colonies" in Greven (ed.), The
Netherlands and the World War Volume III, p. 6; G. Teitler, Anatomie van de Indische defensie. Scenario's,
plannen, beleid 1892 -1920. [Anatomy ofIndonesian Defence. Scenarios, plans, aims 1892 - 1920] Amsterdam: Van
Soeren, 1988, pp. 8 - 9. The neutrality of the Dutch East Indies has been even more neglected in the historiography
than that of the Netherlands itself. For some good stmiing points see: A. W. F. Idenburg, A. C. D. de Graeff,
"Nederlandsch-Indie onder del' invloed van den oOl'log" [Dutch East Indies under the influence of the war] in
Brugman (ed.), Nederland in den oorlogstijd pp. 370 - 400; Carpentier et. al. "The Effect ofthe War upon the
Colonies"; E. P. de Monchy, "Commerce and Navigation" in Greven (ed.), The Netherlands and the World War
Volume II, pp. 115 - 162; Beaufort, Vijftig Jaren pp. 291 - 296; Sanders, "The Netherlands in British Strategic
Planning" pp. 152 - 158; Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands 1ndies,
1900 -1942. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995. For the Netherlands' Navy in the Dutch East and West
Indies see: Stuart, De Nederlandse Zeemachtpp. 382 - 390,394 -407,409 - 419.
13 Article 180 of the Grondwet (Constitution) in Kooiman (ed.), De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht p. 42.
14 Uijterschout, Beknopt Overzicht p. 422; Hoppenbrouwer, "De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1870" p. 15.
15 Tydeman, "De Koninklijke Nederlandsche Marine" p. 241.