Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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Anny] is a disadvantage; but not afttult, because it is necessary and unavoidable." (italics
in original)ls In trying to balance defence needs and neutrality requirements, he realised that
neutrality had to come first.
Nevertheless, his insistence on upholding as much defensive credibility as possible
caused some strife with the government. At times, the civilian leadership feared that
Snijders was too concerned about defence. Nicolaas Bosboom asked him in Pebmary 1917:
Does the Commander-in-Chiefnot lose sight of the only goal for which we
called our armed forces together, maintenance of our neutrality, and if necessary
defence of our ten-itory? We do not aim for war. 16 (italics added)
Requests from parliament to partially demobilise the Army aggravated the situation, as did
governmental acquiescence in lengthening the amount of leave granted to soldiers, with the
result that while military responsibilities continually increased, the number of troops
available to complete these tasks actually decreased. 17 Not surprisingly, by 1918, Snijders
had become highly pessimistic about the chances of withstanding an assault.
There was another critical contributing factor to defence and neutrality difficulties.
Because it was not known which of the powers might breach Dutch neutrality nor in what
circumstances a violation might occur, Snijders had to plan for the possibility of trying to
fight two or more foreign armies simultaneously. It was conceivable, for example, that both
Gennany and Britain might cross into the Netherlands at the same time or closely after each
other. There was no clause in Dutch neutrality regulations that stated if one country
invaded, then the Dutch should automatically side with the enemies of that belligerent.
Accordingly, they could be faced with two conflicts on two fronts against two powers that
were themselves at war with each other. The likelihood of this nightmare occurring only
intensified during the war, as both the Entente and Central Powers wanted to stop the other
from using the Netherlands for strategic gain. If this happened, Snijders expected disastrous
consequences:
15 "Die verspreiding is een nadeel; eenfollt is zij niet, want zij was noodzakelijk en onvermijdelijk" (italics in
original) (Ibid.).
16 "Maar verliest daarmede de opperbevelhebber niet uit het oog, dat het eenige doel, waarmede wij onze strijdmacht
bijeen hebben geroepen, handhaving onzer neutraliteit, desvereischt verdediging van ons grondgebied is? Eenig
oorlogsdoel hebben wij niet." (italics added) (Minister of War, "Memorie van Toelichting" [Memorandum of
Explanation] 27 February 1917, in J. Bosmans, "Neutraal regeren. De neutraliteitspolitiek van de N ederlandse
regering en het parlementaire werk tot eind 1917" [Neutral government. The neutrality policy of the Dutch
government and parliamentary work until late 1917] in Schuursma (ed.), 14 - 18 Volume 2, p. 753).
17 For leave issues, see: Chapter 10, pp. 349 - 353.