Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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H. P. Staal (1905 to 1907), was even forced to resign in 1906 when the First Chamber of
the Estates General refused to accept his proposals. 35 Hendrik Colijn, however, did manage
to implement widespread changes in the armed forces when he took office in 1911.
International crises, in Morocco, the Balkans and elsewhere, made the Netherlands' position
far more precarious. Europe was becoming increasingly unstable and in recognition of the
need to boost security, parliament became more amenable to improvements and
expenditure. Colijn's Military Law (1912) ensured that the anned forces became more
youthful by increasing the numbers of men conscripted yearly, while decreasing the length
of time they spent in militmy service. 36 Instead of eight years, navy sailors now served five,
and infantry six years. Colijn also eliminated the four months period of training: all troops
received eight and a half months, except for those deemed unable to complete this, who
were instructed for six and a halfmonths. 37 Specialists, such as cavalry and gun-layers,
served and trained longer: fortress artillery and torpedo corps received 15 months
instruction, while mounted troops were trained for two years?8
Many of the military laws passed between 1898 and 1913 were not retroactive.
Thus, when soldiers mobilised in August 1914, they served under different regulations, as
well as having different levels of proficiency. The four oldest contingents (in the landweer)
had become military initiates under the 1861 Militiewet, most others under the laws passed
between 1901 and 1911. 39 In other words, the level of expertise enjoyed by soldiers during
the mobilisation varied greatly, especially between troops trained for only four months and
those who received eight and a half months or more. Among specialist sections, such
inconsistencies were even more glaring. The improvements made by Colijn in 1912 only
applied to intakes conscripted from 1913 onwards. The 1914 contingent of infantry as well
as the 1913 and 1914 cavahy and mounted artillelY troops levied in 1913 and 1914, had not
yet completed training by the time the government declared the August mobilisation. In
effect, only the 1913 infantry intake fully benefited from Colijn's legislation. The latest
laws were unable to make a significant impact. This, in tum, influenced the course of the
35 Ibid. pp. 144 - 146.
36 See: Appendix 2, p. 452.
37 Staatsblad. no. 21, 2 February 1912, Article 76.
38 Ibid. Article 6; Uijterschout, Be/mopt Overzicht p. 436.
39 Klinkert, "De Nederlandse mobilisatie van 1914" p. 27.