Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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September 1914, in 1915, smuggling was a much-discussed topic between the Netherlands
and the belligerents, and, as a consequence, became a central issue for the maintenance of
neutrality and security. 53 In the context of late 1915, therefore, using the War Law to
monitor illegal trade was wholly justified. In his war memoirs, Nicolaas Bosboom,
explained the "state of siege" exactly in this vein - it was necessary, if only to check that
NOT goods stayed in the country and that no contraband crossed the frontier. 54
However, in the context of September 1914, the threat smuggling posed to
neutrality was less obvious. At the time, the government recognised that if smuggling
became umnanageable, it was conceivable that the belligerents might accuse the
Netherlands of acting unscrupulously. The Minister President, P. W. A. Cort van der
Linden, explained to Snijders that smuggling brought the country closer to war.55 What was
of far greater concern to both men was the impact of smuggling on stores of food and raw
materials. Snijders was particularly anxious to meet the needs of the anned forces, and
especially to suspend illegal trade in horses. Using border troops against smugglers seemed
a practical step to take, although Snijders hoped that it would be a temporary measure. He
did not wish troops to involve themselves too deeply in smuggling matters; they had enough
trouble safeguarding territorial integrity, let alone policing what was essentially a civilian
concern. Nevertheless, as the war dragged on and smuggling continued unabated, ultimately
becoming an issue endangering Dutch neutrality, the military could not be freed from
exercising some responsibility over trade matters. Even after the govermnent imposed the
eerste linie ("first line"), commanders still used their "state of siege" jurisdiction to prevent
illegal trade. 56
The need to monitor the movement of foreigners provided another reason for the
implementation of the "state of siege" in certain areas. Espionage was a matter of obvious
concern to High Command. Foreigners could violate Dutch neutrality by exploiting the
Netherlands non-belligerency to spy on their enemies and as a base to relay infonnation to
their govermnents. Of notable concern to neutrality were regions from which foreign
53 For example, see: the piles of correspondence on the issue in ARA, "Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 'A'
dossiers" entry no. 2.05.04, inventory no. 689, 702, 710, 712, 717, 737. Sanders, "The Netherlands in British
Strategic Planning" p. 80; Smidt, "De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel" p. 52.
54 Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 304.
55 Minister President to Commander-in-Chief, 26 September 1914, in ARA, "Archieven van de Generale Staf' entry
no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 95.
56 See: Chapter 8, pp. 259 -272, for a more detailed overview of how the military policed smuggling.