Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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ports. 140 In the words of one historian, it was the "most spectacular single act of force
employed by the United States against a neutral" up to that time. 141
The requisitioning of ships in March 1918 was not the first time Britain had taken
extreme action against Dutch ships. In June 1916, its Royal Navy forced the entire Dutch
fishing fleet, consisting of 150 vessels stationed in the NOlih Sea, into British harbours.
They refused to release the ships, the crews, or the catch until the Netherlands agreed to
supply Britain, rather than Gennany, with the fish. Because of Gennan expectations, the
Dutch could not do this. However, unlike the United States in 1918, in 1916 Britain
negotiated a quota that was equally acceptable to Gennany.142
The Dutch were incensed at the requisitioning of one-third of their merchant fleet
in March 1918 143 and vigorously protested against the breach of sovereignty. 144 The
Gennans were also furious. They argued that the Allies had caused a major violation of
neutrality, and that Gennany could not sit idly by and let the Netherlands be abused in this
manner. Gennany threatened to declare war on the neutral if the Dutch did not give them
similar advantage. It demanded transit rights across Dutch tenitory for military materials
and German troops. The demands placed the Dutch in an extremely testing position. In the
end, only a compromise between the belligerent parties preserved their neutrality. 145
In an attempt to temper Dutch anger at the requisitioning, the Allies allowed more
food shipments to the Netherlands and became more lenient in their blockade. 146
Nevertheless, the Netherlands' vulnerability had been exposed. This became even more
evident in March 1918, when Germany declared that it would no longer recognise neutral
ships, because there was no guarantee that they were carrying neutral goodS. 147 Gennan
submarines sunle neutral vessels indiscriminately within and outside the "war zone". On
this issue, as in most others, the fate of the Dutch was left open to the whim of the warring
states.
140 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality oJthe Netherlallds p. 202; Porter, "Dutch Neutrality" p. 154. For a list of
requisitioned ships, see: Hoogendijk (ed.), De Nederlandsche Koopvaardij pp. 495 - 497.
141 Thomas A Bailey, in Frey, "Bullying the neutrals" p. 239.
142 Bell, A history oJ The Blockade pp. 484 - 487; Ritter, De Donkere Poort Volume 2, pp. 53 - 56; Vries,
"Schipperen om te leven" p. 760. For the diplomatic discourse on the issue of the capture of the fishing fleet see:
Smit (ed.), Bescheiden betrefJende de buitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 -
1919. Vierde Deel1914 -1917 p. 587.
143 Watson, "Britain's Dutch Policy" p. 166.
144 Bailey, The Policy oJthe United States pp. 214, 220.
145 For further details, see: section "The Notorious Question of Sand and Gravel", pp. 224 - 229 below.
146 Smit, Tien studien p. 119.
147 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality oJthe Netherlands p. 237; Watson, "Britain's Dutch Policy" p. 196.