Between the devil and the deep blue sea - University of Canterbury

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LEAVE FOR ONE AND ALL
Although on paper, the landstormwetten increased the total strength of the military
to around 400,000 men, its actual strength was far below that figure. Leave granted to entire
conscript intakes ensured that at anyone time, fewer than 200,000 were actually mobilised.
Among the mobilised troops, short-tenn and extraordinary leave provisions meant that
more were absent than present in their military units. In a letter to the Minister of War in
October 1916, Snijders complained that 61 per cent of mobilised soldiers were unavailable
for active duty because they were on some fonn of short-tenn leave, an abysmal figure for
an anned force supposedly on high military alert. 61 He also warned that of the 39 per cent of
troops that were available on any day, most were inadequately prepared for war. He feared
that it was virtually impossible to mount an effective defence if it became necessary.
Conscripts were entitled to several categories ofleave: "indefinite long-tenn",
"indefinite short-tenn", "normal" and "extraordinary". Indefinite long-term leave was given
in peacetime to soldiers after training or demobilisation. It meant they were free to go where
they wanted, at least until called up for mobilisation by the government. Indefinite short­
term leave was very similar, in that soldiers were freed from service, although they could be
recalled during a second mobilisation. This type of leave was usually granted in time of
crisis, and its only restriction was that affected soldiers could not move out of the country.
Starting in May 1915 with the oldest landweer intakes (year 1907, conscripts born in 1879),
the entire landweer, excepting a few specialist units, went on indefinite short-tenn leave by
December 1916. Two months later, the oldest military intakes (year 1910, conscripts born
in 1890) received indefinite leave as well, followed throughout 1917 and 1918 by the next
oldest intakes. 62
There were a number of contributing factors as to why so many men could go on
indefinite leave. One of the most pervasive in the popular mind was the idea that older men
had a greater responsibility to their families, homes, and to the economy than they did to
idling in barracks awaiting a military confrontation that may not eventuate. SuppOliers of
granting indefinite leave to older conscripts used moral and economic reasoning to sway
61 Commander-in-Chief Snijders to Minister of War Bosboom, 11 October 1916, in ARA, "Archieven van de
Generale Star' entry no. 2.13.70, inventory no. 411.
62 See: Appendix 10, p. 463.